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INTRODUCTION
In 19^1* for the second time in the twentieth oontury, much of the world was at war.

Once again, it was a

struggle of life and death, a fight for survival of demo
cracy directed against a dictatorial aggressor, Germany.
In World War I, it had been the aim of the United States as
expressed by President T. Woodrow Wilson ”to make the world
safe for democracy.”

This failed.

During World War II,

the United Nations fought for a similar goal, attempting to
assure a better outcome by means of conferences in which
they set forth their aims.

The disastrous results of the

Paris Peace Settlement had taught a lesson.

It was thought

that definite plans for postwar actions had to be agreed
upon prior to the end of the fighting, if chaos was to be
avoided and a reasonably stable future assured.

Thus, to

achieve the highly Idealistic goal of a democratic world,
it was determined to deal with postwar planning in a real
istic manner at a series of Allied conferences.
In the subsequent Allied conferences, realism would
again conflict with idealism.

If the Western Allies alone

could have negotiated, the outcome might have been promis
ing for a workable solution.

To coordinate their plans,

1

2
the Big Three had to find a common denominator for their
discussions.

The military task provided sufficient cohe

siveness to bind the three together; yet* they neglected
their different past.

The Soviet Union was heir to the an

cient Eastern cultures of the Assyrians and the Persians;
the United States and Great Britain represented the old
Western culture which had originated in Greece*

Traditions,

customs and philosophies were different.
When the Big Three were joined by Prance after the
end of the war, the Four Powers were still separated by
their ideologies, governments, methods of striving for a
goal, and, most important, in their policies.
decisive barrier between them.

This was a

To administer Germany ac

cording to the Pour Power arrangements, agreed upon in the
Allied conferences, required a similar approach from all
parties involved.

Since this commonality was lacking, Ger

many fell victim to the inter-Allied discord.
Berlin, as an embattled city between the Eastern
and the Western forms of civilization, became the symbol of
differing and changing ideas.

The flhot war 11 that had been

fought at Marathon, broke out anew in the form of a 11cold
war 11 in Berlin.

The facade of accord errected at the Allied

conferences crumbled and became manifested by the Berlin
blockade, which.once again divided the world along ancient
political lines.

CHAPTER I
FROM THE ATLANTIC MEETING TO THE TEHERAN CONFERENCE
19^1 - 19*K3
The Atlantic Meeting:
August 14, I9CT
From the very outset of World War II, the United
States, though officially neutral, had assumed a rather ben
evolent attitude toward countries at war with Germany.

This

was manifested in the help extended to Great Britain under
the cash-and-carry program and later through lend-lease ar
rangements.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt skillfully steered
the nation toward the day when the United States actively
entered the war as a belligerent for the western cause.^
August, 1941, his intentions became quite evident.

By

In the

middle of this month, under the cover of secrecy, the Presi
dent met with British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill on
a battleship off the Newfoundland coast to discuss the situ
ation.

The result of their talks was announced to the world

1Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the Ameri
can People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1964),'
pp. 717-718. Hereafter cited as Bailey, A Diplomatic History
of the American People.
3

k>
in the form of the Atlantic Charter of August 1^, 19*H.

2

A week after the Atlantic Charter was signed, Roose
velt sent a message to Congress, explaining that at the
meeting with Churchill definite plans had been developed to
safeguard the world from Hitler1s aggression.
dent failed to elaborate on this point.

3

The Presi

Instead, the mes

sage included the text of the Atlantic Charter.
The Atlantic Declaration was an expression of common
ideas rather than a clear statement as to the strategy to be
pursued in the effort to defeat the Axis powers.

The most

Important points of the Charter read as follows:
“First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, ter
ritorial or other;
"Second, they desire to see no territorial changes
that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes
of the people concerned;
"Third, they respect the right of all peoples to
choose the form of government under which they will
live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and selfgovernment restored to those who have been forcibly
deprived of them;
“Forth, they will endeavor, with due respect for
their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment
of all states, great or small, victor or vanquished,
of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the
raw materials of the world which are needed for
their economic prosperity;

“Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi ty
ranny, they hope to see established a peace which
2

U.S., Department of State, Peace and War: United
States Foreign Policy: 1931-19^1, Department of State Publi
cation No. 1983 (Washington; U.S. Government Printing Of
fice, 1943), PP. 717-720.
3Ibld.. p. 718.

5
will afford to all nations th© means of dwelling in
safety within their own boundaries, and which will
afford assurance that all the men in all the lands
may live out their lives in freedom from fear and
want? • . .
The President concluded his message to Congress by stating
that the principles set forth in the Atlantic Charter would
have to be accepted by all nations, unless they wanted to be
associated with naziism.
Certainly, the Charter enunciated democratic ideals.
Although Roosevelt*s closing remarks were somewhat limited,
it might have been better had he instead referred to totali
tarian systems in general.

At this point, though, he seemed

well justified; the men in the Kremlin, reading the signs of
the time, played the tune the West wished to hear.

The Sov

iet union was one of the fifteen anti-Axis nations that had
endorsed the Atlantic Declaration by September 2A, 19^1.^
World reaction differed.

The Charter undoubtedly

stirred hope in the hearts of the people conquered by Ger
many, encouraging them to resist German aggression by the
promise of a better future.
served a propaganda purpose.

Thus, the Declaration may have
In Great Britain, however, it

came as an anti-climax to the exciting tension that had de
veloped when the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting was announced.
From the first report Englishmen had hoped that the confer^Ibld., pp. 718-719.

5Ibld., p. 719.

6Richard B. Morris (ed.), Encyclopedia of American
History (New Yorks Harper & Bros., 1961)7 P •

6
ence would result In the entry of America into the war, and,
thus, a mere enunciation of a set of common principles was a
7

grave disappointment,1
In spite of the inconclusiveness of the Atlantic De
claration, the importance of other events of 194-1 cannot be
overestimated.

The wartime alliance of Great Britain, the

Soviet Union, and the United States of America, a reality by
the end of the year, sprang from two costly blunders of the
Axis powers during 19*1-1.

They were the German decision to

invade Russia and the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor.
While the war would continue for'longer than three more
years, the alliance of the Big Three, as the United Kingdom,
the U.S.S.R., and the U.S.A. were henceforth labeled, which
came into being largely because of these actions, was to
prove more than a match for the conquering German armies and
the forces of Imperial Japan and their lesser allies.
If peacetime politics make for strange bedfellows,
then war diplomacy seems to set aside most previously ad
hered to guidelines for the paramount issue at hand— the de
feat of the enemy.

Only in this light can the help, friend

ship, and confidence that the United States showered upon
the Soviet Union be understood.

Roosevelt and his staff

felt quite sure they could cope with the Russian communists.
Yet, their confidence was somewhat surprising considering
7
H. V. Morton, Atlantic Meeting (London: Methuen & Co.
Ltd., 19^4), P. 12?.

7
that the United States had withheld recognition of the
g
U.S.S.R. for fifteen years.
Diplomatic relations were not
established until 1933? therefore, America lacked crucial,
extensive knowledge about the formative years of develop
ment of the Soviet giant.^
Flashbacks The Hltler-Stalln Pact
On August 23, 1939* the world was startled by the
Hitler-Stalin Pact of non-aggression.10

A week later, World

War II was triggered off when German troops marched into Po
land.

The correlation between these two events was obvious:

Two dictators, whose political ideologies were diametrically
opposed, shrewdly weighing the risks involved, had come to
the conclusion that they had made a good deal— at least for
the time being*

Both had bought time.

Hitler had avoided

the danger of a two front war; Stalin had gained a vital
break that enabled him frantically to increase and to speed
up the Russian armament program.

The West had to swallow

the insult, since both England and France had wooed the So
viet Union in an effort to make her join them in a military
^David J. Dallin, The Big Three: The United States.
Britain. Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19^5)»
p. 251• Hereafter cited as Dallin, The Big Three.

9i m a .
Bruno Gebhardt (ed.), Handbuch der Deutschen Gesehichte, Vol.IVs Die Zelt der Weltkrlege (8th ed. rev.?
Stuttgart: Union Verlag, 1 9 5 9 ) » PP- 246-2^7* Hereafter cit
ed as Gebhardt,(ed.), Handbuch der Deutschen Geschlchte,

8
entente against Germany.^

As a ruthless though astute

statesman, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin had viewed the West
ern approaches with extreme suspicion.

He believed that it

was the concealed aim of the West to push Russia into war
with Germany in order to divert the impending German attack
12
from their own frontiers.
Interpreting Western promises
for military aid in this light, he rejected those proposals.
Once the German attack on Russia had become a reality, the
Soviet Union, maneuvering in best Leninist tradition among
13
conflicting interests, ^ belatedly Joined the Allies— and
got all the Western help she needed.

By Western standards,

Stalin's actions were unprincipled, but they served the pur
pose.
The man in the White House forgave it all.

Fifteen

years of non-recognition were forgotten just as much as Rus
sia's indirect part in the start of the war, when she sold
out Poland by signing the Hitler-Stalin Pact.

Not all Amer

icans were so naive, though, in their attitude toward the
U.S.S.R. Republican Senator Vandenberg continued to dis
trust the newly acquired ally for the democratic cause.

In

19^*2, he was already alarmed that America would succumb to

11

Ibid.

12

Soviet Information Bureau (ed.), Falsifiers of His
tory (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 19^8)• P P •
2?-29.
13
^David J. Dallin, Russia and Postwar Europe (New Hav
en: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 73-7^.

9
Soviet wishes.

The Issue at hand was the top-secret visit

of Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov to Washington in
June of that year.

Molotov demanded U.S. declarations of

war against Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania, satellites of
I2i
Germany, countries which were at war with Russia.
Sena
tor Vandenberg felt that the request was legitimate enough,
but by like token America could ask for a Russian declara
tion of war on Japan.

Of course, none was forthcoming,^

and the American request for airbases in Russia remained
equally unanswered."^
Very little attention was paid to Senator Vandenberg’s doubts about Soviet trustworthiness and suspicions of
Russian designs.

The minority opinion was swept aside by

jthe growing crescendo of war.
%19^3*

The turning point was

Russians victory in the Battle of Stalingrad turned

*out to be the beginning of the end.

Actions on the various

battlefrents naturally dominated the minds of the people im
mediately involved.

For the statesmen, however, the time

1/L

Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (ed.), The Private Papers
of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952),
pp. 31-32. Hereafter cited as Vandenberg Papers.
1*5
-'Russia finally did declare war on Japan— on August
9, 19^5» five days after the first atomic bomb fell on Hiro
shima, in a last minute effort to get in on the spoils of
the Japanese defeat. For reference to this episode see:
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs. Vol. I: Year of Decisions (Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955)# P» ^25*
Hereafter cited as Truman, Year of Decisions.
16
Vandenberg Papers, pp. 31-32.
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for conferences had arrived.

While the soldiers had to fin

ish their jobs, diplomacy took over behind the scene to make
plans for the postwar world.
The Casablanca Conference;
January 14-24, 19^3
Roosevelt and Churchill met frequently during the
war to coordinate their plans.

The last of their conferen^

ces to be dominated by military discussions of strategy was
held in Casablanca from January 1^ to January 2^, 19^3*

If*

the Casablanca meeting would have been confined to purely
military talks, its meaning in history would be obscure, to
day.

It was the spectacular joint Roosevelt-Churchill press

conference that guaranteed Casablanca a distinguished place
in the annals of the Second World War.

For the first time,

Roosevelt publicly announced his policy of "Unconditional
Surrender.”

In his closing remarks to the press, he said:

Another point. I think we all had it in our
hearts and heads before, but I don*t think it has
been put down on paper by the Prime Minister or my
self, and that is the determination that peace can
come to the world only by the total elimination of
German and Japanese war power.
. • . The elimination of German, Japanese, and
Italian war power means the unconditional surrender
by Germany, Italy, and Japan.1 '
Unconditional Surrender has since become a matter of much
speculation as to the effect on the war.

Roosevelt quali-

17
'Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.), The Public Papers and Ad
dresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 19^3 Vol.: The Tide Turns
(New York:" Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1950), p . 39•

11
fied his statement by going on to say:
* . . it {^Unconditional Surrender] does mean the
destruction of the philosophies in those countries
which are bas^d on conquest and the subjugation of
other people.
This latter part of his announcement would indicate that the
President talked about the destruction of philosophies, not
of people, but this qualification was to no avail.
Roosevelt had added fuel to the German propaganda
machine.

German propaganda Minister Dr. Joseph Goebbels

used Unconditional Surrender as an appeal to the Germans to
rally behind the government, calling for absolute resistance
and the total war effort.^

Whether Unconditional Surrender

prolonged the war or whether Germany would have fought to
the gruesome end anyway, can be a matter of speculation, on
ly.
The majority of writers, in an attempt to estimate
the impact of Roosevelt*s unforgetful utterance, wished the
20
words would have never crossed his lips.
Unconditional
Surrender was under discussion at Casablanca, but the Presi
dent and the Prime Minister had reached no conclusion on
this subject.

The communique, issued on January 26, 19^3.

18-TV4
^
Ibid.
^ T h i s was confirmed by a letter from Mrs. Liese-Lotte
Grosse, dated April 10, 1967.
20
The writer of this paper did not find a single
source indicating approval of the enunciation of Undonditional Surrender.

12
did not mention the fateful clause.

21

The State Department Subcommittee on Security Prob
lems, under the chairmanship of Norman Davis, had toiled
22
with the problem of the end of the war.
Having been haunt23
ed by the “dagger legend,“
and in an effort to avoid the
birth of another myth of this kind, the Subcommittee had re
commended that:
On the assumption that the victory of the United
Nations will be conclusive, unconditional surrender
rather than an armistice should be sought from the
principal enemy states. . . ^
This recommendation was approved on May 21, 19^2, more than
six months before the Casablanca announcement.

While in

Casablanca, Churchill cabled the War Cabinet about Roose
v e l t s suggestion of Unconditional Surrender.

The Cabinet

21

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Rela
tions, A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents,
19^1-^9, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1950, Senate Doc. 123* PP.
£- 7 “ Hereafter cited as Basic American Documents, 19^1~^9.
22
Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War
They Waged and the Peace They Sought ('Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1957)* P. 108. Hereafter cited
as Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin.
23
^The “dagger legend” sprang up after World War I,
When an armistice was unconditionally accepted by the civil
ian head of the German delegation, Matthias Erzberger, be
fore the German armies were actually defeated in the field.
The Versailles Peace Treaty was the disastrous result. The
idea developed that the military had been “stabbed in the
back” by the civilians and that Germany would not have nec
essarily lost the war. For details see: Gebhardt (ed.),
Handbuch der Deutschen Geschichte, Vol. IV, pp. 118-119.
2L
Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 108.

13

2<

did not challenge the idea. J

The Prime Minister was reportedly appalled

26

when

the President blurted out his thoughts on this subject, but
he immediately adjusted to the situation and, at least in
27
public, supported Roosevelt. ' Privately, to his Foreign
Minister, he confided that he doubted the wisdom of fusing
the Germans f,in a solid desperate block for whom there is no

28

hope.”

Churchill further maintained that the announcement

of Unconditional Surrender was probably meant as an act of
29
defiance, since the war was not yet won. 7
Stalingrad was gained the following week.

SO

The victory of
Roosevelt him

self stated later that he had had no intention of mentioning
Unconditional Surrender until suddenly “the thought popped
Ibid., pp. 110-111. See also Winston S. Churchill,
The Second World War. Vol. IV: The Hinge of Fate (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), P* 6&6. Hereafter cited as
Churchill, The Hinge of Fate.
Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 110.
also Churchi117 TRe Hinge of'Fate, p. 686.

See

27
(Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Inti
mate History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 19^8), p . 696.
Hereafter cited as Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins. See al
so Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, p. 687♦
28
Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. V:
Closing the Ring (Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951)»
p. 6657 Hereafter cited as Churchill, Closing the Ring.
U.S. Senator Vandenberg shared Churchill1s misgivings. See:
Vandenberg Papers, p. 91*
29
^Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 696.

3°ibia.. p. 695.

1^
into . . . [his] mind .“^1

Trying to determine how deeply

the Presidents poor health affected his actions, is again a
matter of pure speculation.

Harry Hopkins, his closest per

sonal adviser, noted that Roosevelt suffered from a fevery
cold during the days immediately following the Casablanca
32
Conference.
As is so often the case with a big bureaucratic ma
chinery, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull seemed unin
formed on the subject of Unconditional Surrender, as prepar
ed by the State Departments Subcommittee on Security Prob
lems.

He shared Churchill*s fears that the statement was

rather premature, and that it would spur on the Germans to
endless resistance.-^

Aside of this point, Hull grasped the

idea that Unconditional Surrender would necessitate an ela
borate program in order to enable the conquering powers to
administer the defeated nations down to the lowest local le
vel.

The Secretary felt the Allies were not prepared to

take the overwhelming obligations that such a program would
entail.-'

It was the purpose of the following conferences

to work out a plan— providing for Allied unity— that would
*^Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 110.
-^Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 695•
-^Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. II,
(New York: The Macmi1lan~~Company, 19^8), p . 1570. Hereafter
cited as Hull, Memoirs.

3ifrbid.

'

15
assure just such measures.
The Moscow Conference of
Foreign Ministers
The first Big Three meeting of any consequence was
the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers which was held
?

from October 19 to October 30, 19^3*

U.S. Secretary of

State Cordell Hull and British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden
were the guests of Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov.
The primary subject of discussion was the postwar treatment
of Germany.

Although it was still too early in the war to

advance any definite proposals, the foundation for the fu
ture postwar Europe was laid at this first tripartite con
ference.

This was done when the foreign ministers, acting

upon a motion introduced by Eden, established the European:
Advisory Commission (EAC), with headquarters in London.
The EAC was to serve as a sounding board for Allied ideas;
more specifically, it was designated to draw up detailed
suggestions as to the postwar treatment of Germany.

After

emphasizing the warm atmosphere of confidence which charac
terized the meeting, the official communique, issued on Nov
ember 1 , 19^3 * made a rather hazy reference to initial steps
-^International Conciliation (ed.), Documents for the
Year 19^3 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for international
Peace, 19^3, Doc. 395), p. 600.
-^Hull, Memoirs, p. 1283.

that had been taken in regard to the future of Germany.

37

For the first time at this conference, the dismemberment of
Germany was being considered.

The idea, first developed in

the U.S. State Department, had found subsequent approval by
President Roosevelt; and although Secretary Hull personally
did not favor the plan, he presented the suggestion to his
Allied c o l l e a g u e s . M o l o t o v reported it to Stalin.

At the

following conference meeting, the Soviet Foreign Minister
gave his enthusiastic support to the proposal.

The Russians

liked the idea so much that, with the consent of Hull, they
39
resolved to make dismemberment a Soviet plan. 7
This first tripartite conference was concluded in.
such good spirits, probably because the foreign ministers
stayed on rather general ground.

The hard bargaining ses

sions when drafts would have to be hammered out in detail
were still hidden in the future.

General agreement was

reached that Germany, with the exception of East Prussia
which was to be completely detached from Germany, should be
reduced to her borders of 1937*

All other questions were

referred to the EAC for detailed study.

no

1

^ Basic American Documents, 19^1-A9; pp. 10-11.
^Hull, Memoirs, pp. 128A-1287.
39Ibid.
Lq
Ibid. See also Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin,
358*» and Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 298.
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The Teheran Conference:
November 28-December

Encouraged by the harmony that characterized the
Moscow Conference of Foreign Mini store, the Big Three were
now anxious to meet in person.

Roosevelt and Churchill* of

course, were old acquaintances; neither one of them had yet
encountered Stalin.

The trio convened for their first sum

mit meeting in the Persian capital of Teheran, from November
28 to December 1, 1943.
what was to follow.

These days set the pattern for

Stalin, showing his Jovial side as long

as things were going his xvay, completely charmed Roosevelt,
managing at the same time never to concede on a point of im
portance.

"Roosevelt felt sure that . . . Stalin was *geta-

ble ,1 despite his bludgeoning tactics and his attitude of
cynicism toward such matters as the rights of small nations."

42

The President was certain that Russia, her wishes

being granted, would be "cooperative in maintaining the
48
peace of the postwar world." ^ It might have been a bles41

For the complete official American account of Tehe
ran see? U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of
the United States: Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at
Cairo and TehranT l W 3 l Department of State Publication No•
7187 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office,
1961). Hereafter cited as Foreign Relations: Tehran.
Note: Two ways of spelling the name of the Persian
capital, Teheran and/or Tehran, are correct. Different
authors vary.
42

Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 796-799

43rbld., p. 799.

18
sing that he died before becoming utterly disillusioned.
During the Teheran Conference, harmony prevailed be
tween Roosevelt and Stalin with only a minor discordant
point arising.

The Soviet leader casually questioned the

astuteness of Unconditional Surrender as long as the impllcations were not clearly defined to the Germans. ^

The sub

ject was dropped, since more important topics were on the
agenda.

But Roosevelt did not forget Stalin*s criticism;

this was the President*s brainchild with whioh he did not
wish to be harassed.

He expressed his irritation in a memoiiA
randum to Cordell Hull.
The most important military decision, to be reached

at Teheran, was the issue of the opening of the Second
Front.

OVERLORD (the code name for the Atlantic invasion),

had been a matter of Anglo-American-Russian concern since
the very outset of their alliance.

Prior to Stalingrad, the

Soviets had continually pressed for the Second Front, with
the intent to gain some relief for their beleaguered na
il7
tion. r Although plans were in the making, the West had so
Ixh
Gregory Klimov, The Terror Machine: The Inside Story
of Soviet Administration in Germany, trans. H. C. Stevens
(New Yorks Frederick A. Praeger Inc., Publ., 1953). p. 125.
Hereafter cited as Klimov, The Terror Machine.
^ Foreign Relations: Tehran, p. 513*
1*6
Elliott Roosevelt (ed.) F.D.R.: His Personal Letters: 1928-19^5 (New Yorks DueilT Sloan and Pearce, 1950),
p. 1485.
^Alexander Werth, Russia at Wars 19^1*19^5 (New Yorks

19
far been unable to respond with action.

Allied forces were

tied in the Mediterranean and the Pacific,
of 1943. the tide had turned.

Toward the end

Russia's confidence increased

daily due to the rapid westward advance of the Red Army,
Even though tremendous sacrifices lay still ahead, the Soviet Union was confident of final victory.

Future political

considerations, therefore, could again assume a more promi
nent role in the minds of the Kremlin leaders? and they did.
Soviet Foreign Vice-Commjssar Alexander Korneichuk was preoc
cupied with political Implications of the Russian offensive.
During the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, he indis
creetly revealed to British war correspondent Werth:
Things are going so well on our front that it might
be even better not to have the Second Front till
next spring. If there were a Second Front right
now, the Germans might allow Germany to be occupied
by the Anglo-Americans, It would make us look pret
ty silly. Better to go on bombing them for another
winter; and also let their army freeze another win
ter in Russia; then get the Red Army right up to
Germany, and then start the Second Front. 9
The Russian's wish became reality; by D-Day, June 6 , 1944,
the Red Army penetration into Eastern Europe was under way.
At Teheran, the launching date for OVERLORD was set
for May, 1944.-^

Preceding discussions at the conference

were sometimes stormy,

Churchill's political instinct did

E, P, Dutton & Co., Inc., 1964), pp. 745-7^6.
cited as Werth, Russia at War,

48Ibld., p. 7^7.

49Ibld.

^Foreign Relations; Tehran, p. 576.

Hereafter
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not give in to Russian geniality.

Suspecting possible Sovi

et schemes, he suggested to support OVERLORD by simultan
eously launching minor Allied invasions in Italy and through
the Eastern Mediterranean.-^

Stalin objected. ^

Since the

\

President failed to support the Prime Minister, this strate
gy was abandoned.

Roosevelt later recalled:

Whenever the P.M. argued for our invasion through
the Balkans . . . i t was quite obvious to everyone
in the room what he really meant. That he was
above all anxious to knife up into central Europe,
in order to keep the Red Army out of Austria and Ru
mania, even Hungary, if possible. Stalin knew it, I
knew it, everybody knew it.*-'
Then he went on to say: "Trouble is, the P.M. is thinking
too much of the postwar, and where England will be.
scared of letting the Russians get too strong,"^

H e fs
Consid

ering that America, in spite of isolationist tendencies at
home, had got embroiled in two world wars, originating in
Europe, the Presidents lack of concern as to "the postwar"
was both appalling and tragic.

This attitude endeared him

to the Russians who became deeply suspicious of Churchill.
Roosevelt was spared when, only two months after Teheran,
the Soviet Press embarked upon its first anti-Western cam
paign.

They charged the Prime Minister with conducting se5^Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 3^5*
-^Foreign Relations: Tehran, p. *f>90 and p. 537 *

-^Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York: Duel!,
Sloan and Pearce, Inc., 19^6), p p . l 8^-185*

5Vbia.
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cret peace negotiations with the Germans,

the very thing

of which they had been guilty at the end of World War I,
At the dinner meeting, following the days dispute
over the Atlantic invasion, Stalin used every opportunity
"to get a dig in at Mr. C h u r c h i l l . O b v i o u s l y ,

the Soviet

Premier believed offense to be the best defense.

He must

have worried about the Prime Minister*s political percept
iveness concerning Soviet schemes.
Another problem, discussed at Teheran, was the fate
ful question of Polish frontiers.

Although there still was

a Polish government, functioning from exile in London, it
had no administrative powers.

Officially, the State of Po

land had ceased to exist once the German armies had swept
the country in September,.1939•
provide German Lebensraum.

She had been annexed to

What had been Poland was divided

between Germany and the Soviet Union in accordance with the
secret clause of the Hitler-Stalin Paot.-^
It was up to the Big Three to reconstitute the Po
lish territory.

Churchill agreed with Stalin*s suggestion

that the Poles would not be included in the preliminary
-^Werth, Russia at War, p. 755•
^ Foreign Relations: Tehran, p. 553<7
•^'It is interesting to note that Germany suffered a
somewhat similar fate after World War II, although the situ
ation was reversed--Germany, as a country, retained her ter
ritory (at least part of it), but she had lost her sover
eignty, since there was no German government. Sovereignty
was not restored until May 5* 1955*
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talks, but that they might be asked to Join the discussions
at a later stage. ^

At this crucial stage, people whose fu

ture was about to be determined, were denied the right to
voice their opinion--in direct contradiction to the Atlantic
Charter.
At the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, ten
tative agreement had been reached to reinstate Germany’s
borders as of 1 9 3 7 . ^

At Teheran, the Allies deviated for

the first time from this plan.

Stalin was interested in re

taining the Polish territory which the Soviet Union had
gained as her share of the Hitler-Stalin Pact.

Xn order to

win the Western Allies over to the Russian viewpoint, he
suggested to compensate Poland at Germany’s expense.

Poland

was to move westward all the way to the Oder River.
Roosevelt withheld his opinion while Churchill, inspired by
the idea, compared the proposed border movement to soldiers 1
6l To give even more color to
“left close” drill exercise.
his comparison, he “illustrated his point with three matches

62

representing the Soviet Union, Poland and Germany.”

The

Prime Minister’s response indicated his understanding of the
Soviet plan, but not his'agreement.

Foreign Minister Eden

-^Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 362.
*59
J 7Supra, p. 16.
Foreign Relations: Tehran, p. 510,
6lIbld.. p. 512.

62rbld.
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scornfully told the Russians that border they were proposing
coincided with the "Molotov-Ribbentrop Line.n^
count ered that it was the Curzon Line,

64-

Molotov

The Americans

stayed out of this dispute, probably preferring to treat
this intricate question as a matter of purely European con
cern.

For the time being, the problem was shelved.

During

the Yalta Conference, the plan would move again into the
center of discussion.
The last important matter, briefly discussed at Teh
eran, was Germany.

Since the EAC had been established to

66
work out detailed plans, J Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin
were not under pressure to reach conclusive decisions.
were free to toss up whatever ideas they had in mind.

They
Dis

memberment was repeatedly mentioned until the talks were
postponed for later consideration.

66

Stalin suggested the

^ Ibid., pp. 599-600. Ribbentrop was the German For
eign Minister who negotiated with Molotov the Hitler-Stalin
Pact of 1939.
64The territory under discussion east of those lines
of demarkation had long been a source of dispute between
Russia and Poland. The U.S.S.R. claimed it as part of White
Russia and the Ukraine; Poland countered that the area was
primarily inhabited by Poles. To settle the century old
conflict, the Curzon line was drawn up by the Allies in
1919* The Poles felt cheated. During the 1920*s, they re
gained parts of the territory east of the Curzon line by
armed raids, when the newly established Soviet Union was too
weak to resist. For details see Gebhardt (ed.), Handbuch
der Deutschen Geschlchte, Vol. IV, p. 104-.
-'Supra, p. 15.
66
Foreign Relations: Tehran, pp. 600-603*
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execution of the entire German officer’s corps as a precau
tion to prevent a rebirth of German aggression.
was shocked; Roosevelt took it as a Joke.*^

Churchill

Macabre remarks

of this nature made it obvious that the Big Three had run
out of valid topics demanding immediate, combined delibera
tions.
Before final adjournment of the Teheran Conference,
68
they issued the "Declaration of the Three Powers.”
The
declaration, reinforcing the Atlantic Charter, also gave
ringing endorsement to Allied unity.

To the public the Al

lied leaders conveyed the illusion that they were: "friends
69
in fact, in spirit and in purpose." 7
Presenting the enemy with a united front has always
been one of the most effective propaganda tricks.

There

fore, public criticism of the President’s war policies by
members of the U.S. Congress might have been Interpreted by
constituents as unpatriotic.

On the surface it appeared as

if Roosevelt’s policies found full approval, since critics
of his administration were helpless.

Roosevelt failed to

inform Congress about plans developed at the Allied confer^^Wl111am D. Leahy, I Was There: The Personal Story
of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman
Based on His Notes andTDiaries Made at the Time (New York,
London, Toronto: whlttlesey House, 1950), p. 206* Hereafter
cited as Leahy, I Was There.
^ Foreign Relations: Tehran, pp. 6*10-641.

69rbld., p. 641.
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ences.*^

Secrecy, necessitated by war security measures,

provided him with a convenient excuse.

Senator Vandenberg,

distrusting the President, noted in March, 1944:

"I deeply

fear that there are many sad and tragic disillusionments a71
head.”'

Vandenberg's pessimism, however prophetic, was an

exception to the general prevailing mood.

As 19^3 changed

to 1944, most people felt that they had sound reasons to be
optimistic.

The chain of Allied military victories appeared

to be unending? and, according to the news releases, the in
tensified diplomatic activities seemed to forge the alliance
into genuine international friendship.
70

Vandenberg Papers, pp. 91-92.

71Ibld.. p. 92.

CHAPTER II
FROM THE SECOND QUEBEC CONFERENCE TO THE YALTA CONFERENCE

19kk

-

19^5

The Second Quebec Conference:
S ept ember 11-17, 19 W
During 19*J4, the war entered the final stage.

As

the aimed forces of the United Nations came dangerously
close to her borders* defeat of Germany became Inevitable.
The Red Army threatened from the East; the Anglo-American
forces, after the successful European invasion through Nor
mandy, pushed on from the West.
was only a matter of time.

Germany*s final collapse

Therefore, the issue of a post

war settlement became more pressing.

Diplomatic activities

had to increase in order to keep up with the rapid military
advances.

On the national and international scene, postwar

plans for Germany entered a more definite stage.

It became

evident in the subsequent conferences that national inter
ests became more pronounoed, yet the Big Three continued to
strive for cooperation.
Roosevelt and Churohill met at Quebec in September
i 9 ^ » to reconsider and coordinate Anglo-American policy.
The treatment to be aocorded postwar Germany was the main

26

27
topic on the agenda.^"

The Second Quebec Conference gained a

prominent place in history, because the Morgenthau Plan,
which aimed at reducing Germany to a predominantly pastoral
society, though later rejected, was tentatively approved at
2
this meeting.
Serious divergencies had previously arisen among the
members of the U.S. Cabinet.

The plan, contrary to the us

ual assumption, had not been developed by Henry Morgenthau,
Jr., the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, but rather had its
origin in the lower echelon of the War Department, where a
Colonel Bernstein, disregarding usual Army channels, forwarded a copy to Secretary Morgenthau.

3

The latter picked

up the idea and presented it to the President, in August
19^.

At this time, only two-and-a-half months after the

United States had suffered heavy casualties in operation
OVERLORD, Roosevelt was in no mood to show mercy toward the
enemy.

He adopted Mor&anthaufs plan and, in a memorandum to

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, reprimanded the War De^B. M. Ratchford and Wm. D. Ross, Berlin Reparations
Assignment; Round One of the German Peace"Settlement (Chapel
Hill7 The University of North Carolina Press, 19^7), P* 30.
Hereafter cited as Ratchford and Ross, Berlin Reparations
Assignment.
2
Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People,
p. 760.
^Walter MiIlls (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New
York: The Viking Press, 1 9 5 1 ) .
Hereaf ter cited as
Forrestal Diaries.
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partment for being too "soft” on Germany,

it

Roosevelt

thought that:
the Germans * . . should be stripped clean and
should not have a level of subsistence above the
lowest level of the people they had c o n q u e r e d . 3
U.S. Army soup kitchens could supply the Germans well enough
to keep them alive.^

In the memorandum to Stimson, the

President further stated:
The German people as a whole must have it driven
home to them that the whole nation has been engaged
in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of mod
ern civilization.?
This statement was in contradiction to Rooseveltfs qualify
ing remarks at the Casablanca press conference, when he an
nounced his policy of Unconditional Surrender, explaining
that it would not mean the destruction of people but of
o
philosophies.
But it expressed his line of thoughts just
prior to his meeting with Churchill at Quebec.

It was in

this mood that Roosevelt appointed Morgenthau to head a com
mittee dealing with German affairs, much to the dismay of
both Hull and Stimson.^
Probably the most amazing aspect in the Morgenthau
-

Hull, Memoirs, p. 1602.
^Forrestal Diaries, p. 10.
6
Ibid. See also Hull, Memoirs, p. 1602.
^Hull, Memoirs, p. 1602.
^Supra, p . 11*
^Forrestal Diaries, p. 11.
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Plan episode was the fact that the Secretary of State was
hardly consulted on the issue,

Hull learned of the adoption

of the plan when he got a copy of Roosevelt*s memorandum to
Stimson of August 26, 19*14.10

Beoause diplomacy and strate

gy Intermingled during the war, the Departments of State and
War worked along similar though separate lines toward a
peace settlement.

The Department of the Treasury, however,

had hitherto not been considered to be responsible for the
task of forming or advanolng postwar policies concerning
Germany,

At Quebec, Churchill was surprised to see Morgen

thau in the capacity of presidential adviser rather than
11
Hull, who had been left behind in Washington.
In spite of
the Prime Minister*s strong opposition to the plan, the
President and his Secretary of the Treasury eventually got
Churchill to give it a ohance by agreeing to serious, joint
12
consideration.
Correlating Germany’s Industrial power
with her war potential, they argued that her industry had to
be eliminated in order to prevent a rebirth of the German
threat.^
Once back in England, after having escaped the per
suasive powers of his American counterpart, Churchill felt
■**°Hull, Memoirs, p. 1602.
■^Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. VI:
Triumph and Tragedy (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953)
p. 156. Hereafter cited as Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy.
12Ibld.
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that the Morgenthau Plan would carry the idea of subjecting
1/4,
Germany ,fto an ultralogical conclusion.”
He agreed with
15
his War Cabinet that the proposal should not be adopted.
American Cabinet members reacted in a similar way,
when Morgenthau*s seeming success became known.
of State Hull was furious;

16

Secretary

he resigned two months later.

17

Secretary of War Stimson had been opposed to the Plan from
the beginning.

He implored the President to abandon the
18
idea of ”a peace of vengeance.”
It was the fear of the
War Department, as expressed by Assistant Secretary John J.
McCloy, that the Morgenthau Plan would throw Germany into
poverty, disorder, and chaos.

This would immensely in

crease the difficulties of the American Army whose Job it
would be to restore order, following the anticipated total
collapse of the Third

R e i c h .

^

Paced with opposition at

home and abroad, Roosevelt dropped the Plan.

The President

mentioned to Secretary Stimson that he could not recall how
it had come to this Quebec agreement.
l2frbld., p. 157.

”It must have been

15Ibid.

Forrestal Diaries, p. 11.
17
'Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People,
P. 911.
18
James P. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York and Lon
dons Harper & Brothers Publishers,' 1947), p. 186. Hereafter
cited as Byrnes, Speaking Frankly.
•^Forrestal Diaries, pp* 11-12.
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done . . . without much thought ;n Roosevelt said.

20

Remnants

of the Morgenthau Plan survived, and were to haunt American
efforts for the first two postwar years.

21

The only other Important plan concerning postwar
Germany, under consideration at the Second Quebec Confer
ence, was the matter of Allied zones of occupation in Ger
many.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff presented a report which

was unanimously approved.

22

The combined chiefs suggested

to award northwestern Germany to Great Britain; southwestern
Germany was to go to the united States.

Additionally, the

United States would receive the port cities of Bremen and
Bremerhaven so as to get direct access to the North Sea.
This area would constitute an American enclave within the
British occupation zone.

American passage to and from the

enclave through the British zone was guaranteed.^

As it

turned out, the latter point had no particular importance,
since the United States and the United Kingdom continued to
cooperate even after the end of the war.

In view of the

work of the European Advisory Commission and the later So
viet challenge of free access to Berlin, it invited compar
ison.
20

Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 186.

21

Infra, pp. 92-93.
22
Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 160.
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The Work of the EAC
The EAC, formed to develop detailed plans for the
Big Three occupation of Germany, had reached a draft agree
ment at the same time that Roosevelt and Churchill met in
Quebec.

A protocol on the zones of occupation and on the

status of Berlin had been signed by the Big Three represent.. 2k
atives to the EAC on September 12, 19^4.
The draft was
subject to ratification by the Allied governments; it was
approved by the united Kingdom in December.19^4, followed by
the approval of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. at the time of
the Yalta Conference in February 1 9 ^ 5 * ^

Germany, within

her 1937 borders, was partitioned into three zones of occu
pation, of which the Soviet Union secured about two-thirds—
all of central and eastern Germany.

Berlin, lying ca. 150

miles deep within the Soviet Zone, was equally split up in
to occupation sectors.

The pattern of division corresponded

to the rest of Germany:

The eastern portion was given to

the Soviets, the British got the northwestern section of
town, and the Americans took the southern part of the
26
city.
Free access to Berlin was not mentioned in the doc
ument.
This and subsequent fateful omissions were caused by
2k

Otto M. von der Gablentz (ed.), Documents on the
Status of Berlin: 19*4-1959 (Mftnchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag,
l9i>9)» PP. 1B-2I". Hereafter cited as Berlin Documents.

25ibia.. p. 20, 21.

26Ibld.. p. 19, 21,
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split authority*

Too many groups worked on the solution to

the German problem; frustration was bound to be the result.
Apart from the difficulty of reaching agreement with the
Russians, American endeavors were overshadowed by divergent
opinions, expressed by representatives of the Departments of
State, of War, and by personal envoys of the President.

The

only unifying directive was Roosevelts expressed desire to
get along with the Russians and to convince the Soviets of
27
the sincere American wish to cooperate with them* '
Different Americans believed in different approaches
of how to best impress this upon the Soviet leaders.

John

C. Winant, U.S. Representative on the European Advisory Com
mission, thought that agreement had been reached because he
had managed to gain the confidence of his Russian counter28
part, F. T. Gousev.
As a close personal friend of Roose
velt, Winant, although officially a member of the State De
partment, completely bypassed this channel of communication,
29
feeling responsible to the President, only. 7 James Riddleberger, a career diplomat and a member of the American EAC
delegation, envisioned the dangerous pitfall of an American
sector in a Berlin, surrounded by the Soviet Zone.

Since

free access from the Western zones to the Western sectors
27
fRobert D. Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors (Garden
City, New Yorks Doubleday and Co., Inc.7 196^), p. 227.
Hereafter cited as Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors.
28Ibld.. p. 232.

29Ibld.
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had not been secured, Riddleberger developed a drastically
new plan.

Presenting his idea to Winant, Riddleberger col

lided head-on with his superior:
Winant accused me ["Riddleberger] of not having
any faith in Soviet intentions and I replied that
on this he was exactly right. . . .
I then suggest
ed that the three zones should converge upon Berlin
as the center of a pie, but this idea got nowhere be
cause Winant was very much opposed to it.*5
Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, who had Just been appointed
political adviser on German affairs-^ and who was to further
distinguish himself in the first postwar years in Berlin
working hand in hand with the later American Military Governor, General Lucius D. Clay,

32

arrived in London in Septem

ber 1944, when the tide of emotions over the EAC protocol
was still running high.

Peeling as uncomfortable as Riddle

berger about the lack of guaranteed access routes to Berlin,
Murphy showed his perceptiveness of Russian shrewdness in
remarking to Winant that "[the Soviets] were sharp bargain
ers who expected other people to be the same.**^

sensing

the Implication and resenting it, Winant sharply repriman
ded the Ambassador;
You [Murphy] have no right to come along at this
late date and make such a proposal Just after we
have agreed upon a draft I ^
3°Ibld., p. 231.

31Ibld., p. 226.

3^Infra. p. 60.
33
-'-'Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 231.
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Winant*s anxiety that his accomplishment could possibly be
frustrated by career diplomats was unfounded,

Riddleberg

er1s suggestion was never taken into serious consideration,
and Murphy had no authority over Winant.

The issue remained

unsettled.
Tolling with the question of Allied administration
of Germany, the EAC continued to work out details.
agreement was reached on November 14, 1944.-^

The next

Upon the Un

conditional Surrender of Germany, an Allied Control Council
was to assume supreme governing authority.

The Control

Council would consist of the Allied Military Governors and
their staffs.

The Control Council was to ensure uniformity

of actions in regard to questions concerning Germany as a
whole.

Decisions would have to be unanimous.

In this

time of happy Anglo-American-Soviet unity, the latter pro
vision might have appeared harmless.

However, once the Rus

sians saw fit to drop the mask, the veto power became their
favorite tool to torpedo Western attempts in cooperative
Allied administration.
While the Military Governors would have supreme au
thority in their respective zones, and the Control Council
would only be used as an instrument for over-all policy,
the constitutional make-up of the German capital was to be
•^Berlin Documents, pp. 22-24.
•^Ibid., p. 22.
Stalin, pp. 359^360*

See also Pels, Churchill, Roosevelt.
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different.

Berlin, it was planned, would be under joint

Allied administration, constituting a separate entity from
the rest of Germany.-^

The city would be governed by an

inter-Allied Kommandatura, constituted by the Allied Com
mandants, that is the commanders of the different Berlin
sectors and their staffs.

The Kommandatura would be subor

dinate to the Control Council.^

The November 14 EAC agree-

ment was subsequently approved by the Big T h r e e . W i t h the
aoceptance of those suggestions, the EAC had served its pur
pose; and since EAC plans were Instrumental in shaping the
postwar world, the institution gained fame.
The Moscow Conference:
October 8-18. 194*T
High level deliberations concerning the postwar per
iod were neither confined to Quebeo nor to London.

The

spectacular advance of the Red Army enabled the Kremlin
leaders to cast their horizons of foreign policy beyond the
limits of the Soviet Union.

Mother R u s s i a ^ victory would

allow a return to the over-all Communist goal— world domin
ation.

Germany had always been central to Soviet thinking.

Her geographic position, in the center of Europe was largely
responsible for her importance in world power factors.

Len

in had recognized this and had advocated the conversion of
^^Berlin Documents, p. 23.
38Ibld.

39Ibld.. p. Zk.
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Germany to communism, but the previous attempts of a take
over had failed,^

Events of July 20, 1944, when German re

sistance. fighters had vainly tried to assassinate Hitler,
had indicated that the chances to establish communism in Ger
many had not improved over the years,

German underground
Al
fighters tended toward the democratic West,
Therefore,

the Soviet union could not expect to look toward Germany as
a potential ally against the Western capitalists,

Stalin

imagined instead the creation of a strong Communist Poland
42
to serve as a buffer,
and the incorporation into the realm
of Soviet influence of as much of Europe as possible.
Churchill, meanwhile, as a seasoned veteran in power
politics, had made a realistic appraisal of the situation.
Since his plan to cut into the “soft under-belly” of Europe
by launching a second invasion from the Balkans had not been
approved at Teheran,
conquest.

43

Eastern Europe was open to Red Army

The Prime Minister went to Moscow to confer with

the Soviet Premier one month after the Quebec meeting.
Churchill wanted to arrive at a compromise with Stalin in an
40
After World War I, the Communist inspired Spartacus
Group attempted to cause a revolt but was defeated. For de
tails sees Gebhardt (ed.), Handbuch der Deutschen Geschichte, Vol. IV, p. 99.
41
Boris Meissner, Russland, die Westmachte und
Deutschland; Die Sowjetlsche Deutschlandpolitik: 19^3-1953
(Hamburg:' H . H . NqIke Verlag,' X9f>3)',r p. 36. Hereafter cited
as Meissner, Russland, die Westmachte und Deutschland.
**2Ibld.

^ Supra. pp. 19-20.
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effort to save as much of Europe as possible.

The issue was

settled among them at their first Kremlin meeting.

At Chur

c h i l l ^ suggestion, Rumania and Bulgaria were to be domi
nated by Russia; in Hungary and Yugoslavia, Russian and
Western predominance were to be equally shared; and Greece
was to come under British influence.

44

Realizing that the

whole deal had taken only a few minutes, Churohill felt a
pang of conscience:
Might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed
we disposed of these issues, so fateful to millions
of people, in such an offhand manner?
Stalin reassured him.
In contrast to their encounter at Teheran, the Mos
cow meeting of the two leaders was characterized by harmony.
Churchill commended ”the great chief of the Russian

46 in glowing terms at a Moscow press conference.

State”

The Prime Minister's main purpose in conferring with the So1 vlet^Premier seems to have been guided by the desire to ap
pease Stalin.

Privately, Churchill never condoned the Geor

gian's tactics.
Soviet schemes became quite evident, again, when the
topio of discussion centered on the Polish question.

Stalin

kept insisting on the Curzon line as the future border be

44

“ Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 227.

^ Ibld.. pp. 227-228.
46

Werth, Russia at War, p. 915*
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tween the U.S.S.R. and Poland.

Under the cover of wishing

to fully compensate Poland, Stalin suggested for the first
time to move Poland not only as far west as the Oder River
but instead all the way to the Neisse River, and also to in
clude the German cities of Breslau and Stettin in the future
Poland.^

The Polish Premier of the government-in-exile,

Stanislaw Mikolajczyke, was present in Moscow.

He refused

to accept the Curzon line, angering Churchill who wanted him
to come to terms with both the Kremlin and its so-called
IlQ
Lubin Polish National Committee.
Compromise, the British
Prime Minister felt, was better than the total loss of Po
land to the democratic cause.

No settlement was reached.

Leaving Moscow, Churchill was more justified than
ever before in his suspicion toward Soviet intentions.
Lubin Poles "were mere pawns of Russia.”^

The

They gave Chur

chill a foretaste of what was to plague Europe in the post
war world.
The Yalta Conference;
February 4-11» 1945
The Crimean Conference, better known as the Yalta
Conference, came to be regarded as the most controversial of
hn
'Meissner, Russland die Weltmachte und Deutchland.
P. 36.
Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 235♦

^Ibld.
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the Big Three meetings.

Based on Roosevelt*s idealistic

concept of an indivisible world, Yalta was hailed as proof
that the Soviets and Western powers could peacefully work
together.^

When the strife of the first postwar years

brought about disillusionment, Western leaders attempted to
justify the Yalta decisions, arguing that they were necessi
tated by the still most important aim of the United Nations
at the time— the defeat of G e r m a n y . A t Yalta, the Soviet
Union was in a comfortable position.

Since the victory at

Stalingrad, the Red Army had steadily advanced and was well
within the eastern part of Germany, when the Conference con
vened.^2

Russia*s imperial ambitions increased with every

additional mile penetrated by the Red Army.

Accordingly,

she became more demanding toward her Allies, attempting to
cloud her intentions with slogans calling for guarantees of
*53
Russian zones of s e c u r i t y . D u e to the military develop
ment, Great Britain and the United States were faced with a
new balance of power among the Allies.

The Yalta decisions

resulted from this new East-West balance.*'

This changed

-^Meissner, Russland, die Weltmachte und Deutchland,
P. 53.
*
:
'’■'"Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 402.
*52
Letter from Mrs. Liese - Lotte Grosse, German house
wife, Essen, Germany, April 20, 19^7*
^Dallln, The Big Three, p. 273.
^ John L. Snell, et al,, The Meaning; of Yalta; Big
Three Diplomacy and the New Balance of Power (Baton Rouge:
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relationship of the distribution of power allowed the Soviet
Union to return to the Marxist-Leninist guideline which pro
jected two opposing world camps*

In accordance with these

traditional Communist beliefs, the U.S.S.R. attempted to
secure as many satellite states as possible, in preparation
of the future fight for the predominance in Europe and

Asia.^
Thus, the stage for the Yalta Conference was set.
The Soviets arrived intent on furthering their plans.

Chur

chill, though well aware of the Russian danger, would again,
as at the Teheran Conference, have to resign to the fact
that he was unable to prevent Communist gains, as long as
President Roosevelt was unwilling to give up his idealistic
concept of the Russians.

This did not happen.

Only half-a-

year before the Yalta meeting, Roosevelt had said in a con
versation with Mikolajczyks
Stalin is a realist, . . . and we mustn*t forget
when we judge Russian actions that the Soviet re
gime has had only few years of experience in inter
national relations. But of one thing I fm certains
Stalin is not an imperialist.5°
Keeping in mind the differing attitudes of the Big Three
Louisiana State University Press, 1956), p. ix.
cited as Snell, The Meaning of Yalta.

Hereafter

-^Meissner, Russland. die Weltmachte und Deutschland,
P- 54.
^ J o h n 'Poland, The Last 100 Days (New Yorks Random
House, 1966), p. 44. Hereafter cited as Toland, The Last
100 Days.

leaders toward one another, the outcome of Yalta was in no
way amazing.
The Polish question demanded again a prominent place
on the agenda.

Since the Red Array had occupied the Polish

territory, the West was confronted with a fait accompli and
had no choice but to accept it.

For the sake of Allied uni*

ty, the United States and Great Britain agreed to grant recognition to the Provisional Government of P o l a n d , b a s i *
cally made up of Lublin Poles.

Recognition was withdrawn

from the Polish government-in-exile, when they refused to
abide by the Yalta decision which was regarded by the Poles
as a verdict Min a b s e n t i a . A f t e r the Soviets had se
cured recognition of their Polish government, agreement was
reached to consider the Curzon line as the Polish-Russian
border.

<9

To compensate Poland at Germany's expense, was

not a new idea.
an Conference,

It had first found expression at the Teher-

60

and had been brought up in the Stalin-Chur6l
chill Moscow talks.
As at Moscow, when Churchill had re

mained uncommitted, Stalin again asked for the Oder-Neisse
-^U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States: Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Malta
and Yalta: 19 $51 Department of State Publication No. 6199
(Wa shi ngton: Uni ted States Government Printing Office,
1955) > P* 973* Hereafter cited as Foreign Relations; Yalta.
^^Jan Ciechanowski, Defeat in Victory (Garden City:
New Yorks Doubleday and Company, I n c , I9V 7), p. 396.
^ Foreign Relations: Yalta, p. 97^*
Supra, p. 22.

^Supra, p. 39*

^3
Line at Yalta.

This time, the Prime Minister objected,

stating that he did not want to "stuff the Polish goose until it dies of German indigestion."

He was conscious of

the fact that England would not favorably react to the
forced deportation of millions of people. ^

Although Stalin

maintained that no Germans were left in the territory under
discussion, having presumably all fled from the Red Army,
Churchill would not have it.

6k

The matter was dropped and re

ferred to the Peace Conference for a final dec!sion.^
Essentially, the Big Three meeting at Yalta followed
the pattern first established at Teheran— and not only in
matters of procedure.

As at Teheran, Stalin, Churchill and

Roosevelt met at Yalta with the intention of adopting de
finite measures.
general subjects.

Again, agreement could only be reached on
Specific plans would be discussed but de

cisions would be postponed to a later, unspecified time.
One such issue was the question of German repara
tions.

Stalin suggested to set the bill at twenty billion

dollars, demanding fifty percent of the total for the
U.S.S.R.

The United States, Great Britain, and all other

62

Foreign Relations: Yalta, p. 720.

63Ibld.

6**Ibld.

3Ibld.. p. 97^. Up to this date, there has been no
Peace Treaty for Germany. The German territories east of
the Oder-Neisse line have been de facto under Polish admin
istration since the end of World War II. They make up about
one-third of Germany of 1937* De jure, recognition has
never been granted to the Oder-Neisse line by the West.
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countries with a rightful claim were to share the other half
of the reparations.

66

At this point, President Roosevelt

recalled the situation which had arisen after World War I,
when the United States had made loans to Germany to enable
her to pay her reparations.

Roosevelt thought that the

United States would not want to finance another such pro=
67
gram. r He dropped his punitive idea of feeding Germany by

68

,fArmy soup kitchens”

and declared instead:

I envision a Germany that is self sustaining but not
starving. There will be no lending of money. • . .
leave Germany enough industry and work to keep her
from starving. ^
Roosevelt also recommended the creation of a reparation com
mission to work out details.^

Such a commission was con

stituted with the seat in Moscow.

Twenty billion dollars

71
were adopted "as a basis for discussion,"f

and the Big
72
Three agreed to allot fifty percent to the U.S.S.R.
By the time the Big Three convened at Yalta, the EAC

drafts for the occupation and control of Germany had been
66

Ratchford and Ross, Berlin Reparations Assignment,

P. 39.
67
'Snell, The Meaning of Yalta, p. 59.
I Was There. p. 3o£.
^ Supra, p. 28.
^Snell, The Meaning of Yalta, p. 59*
7°Ibld.
^ Foreign Relations: Yalta, p. 983.
^bid.

See also Leahy,
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approved by their governments.^

The question of Anglo-

American access to Berlin had been considered a minor point
74
which could be settled later by the zone commanders.
The
7*5
point was left in suspension at this Big Three Conference. ^
Unconditional Surrender, though, in connection with
intentions to dismember and to occupy Germany, became an is
sue once again.

The British Prime Minister maintained that

German resistance to the Allied war effort would increase if
they were told about the dismemerment plans.

76

The Presi

dent agreed with the Soviet Premier that it should be in
cluded in the terms of surrender.^

Roosevelt thought that

because of German suffering in the war, ®*. . . psychological
warfare would [not] affect them any longer „ .

The Up-

Supra. pp. 32, 36.
^Feis, Churchill. Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 533.
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f Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Rus
sians: The Yalta Conference (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 19^9)» PP. 124-125. Hereafter cited
as Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians.
77Ibld.
7 Ibid. Roosevelt was quite right. Germans, especially Berliners, had other things on their minds. Only one
day before the opening of the Yalta Conference, the Allies
had staged another super air attack on the city. As a re
sult, Berliners were concerned with more pressing problems—
to bury their dead. Due to the many casualties in the Al
lied raid of February 3* 1945* coffins were extremely
scarce. It took some people three days of search to locate
one. Reference to this episode was taken from a letter from
Mrs. Liese-Lotte Gr^osse, German housewife* Essen* Germany*
April 20, 196?.
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shot of the discussion was a compromise.

When the communi

que of the Yalta Conference was released to the press on
February 12, 1945# reference was made to the projected Al
lied zones of occupation; but the exact terms for Uncondi
tional Surrender were to be withheld until after the capit
ulation of Germany.^
Another matter concerning Germany was the admission
of France to the "extremely exclusive club" of the Big
80
Three.
Stalin raised some objections but in the end it
was agreed to carve a French zone and sector out of the Am
erican and British zones and sectors respectively.

An in

vitation to France granting her membership on the Allied
81
Control Council was postponed to a later time.
^ Foreign Relations; Yalta, p. 970. Actually, Big
Three concern in this matter was unfounded, although they
did not know it. The German Armed Forces High Command'(OKW)
was familiar with Allied plans of occupation. A complete
copy of "Operation Eclipse" [the planfs code namej had been
captured from the British during the German Ardennes offen
sive, in January, 1945* For the complete story see: Corne
lius Ryan, The Last Battle (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1966), pp. 96-97 # 99-102. Hereafter cited as Ryan, The Last
Battle.
On the whole, Germans were better informed than
might have been expected. Although their knowledge about
"Operation Eclipse" was not as detailed as that of their
leaders, the official NSDAP newspaper Vblklscher Beobachter
made a first reference to the impending Yalta Conference on
February 2, 1945. On February 12, 1945# a long report sum
med up what had become known of the conference, cited the
Swiss newspaper Z^rlcher Zeltung as its source. See: Letter
from Mrs. Llese - Lotte Grosse, April 20, 1967.

80
81

Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, p. 128.

Ibid#, pp. 126-128# See also: Foreign Relations;
Yalta, p. 978, and Leahy. I Was There, pp. 301-302.
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Just like the conference at Teheran, the Yalta Con
ference gave reinforcement to the Atlantic Charter.

With

the Declaration on Liberated Europe, the Allies pledged
their
• • . determination to build in cooperation with
other peace-loving nations a world order under law,
dedicated to peace, security, freedom and the gener
al well-being of all mankind.82
This did not ring true to some critics of the Roosevelt ad
ministration in the United States.

When questioned at a

press conference, held aboard U.S.S. Quincy en route from
Yalta, about his interpretation of the Atlantic Charter and
the application of its ideas to Poland, the President evaded
the issue.

He called the Atlantic Charter "a beautiful

idea11 that had been drawn up to boost England's morale in
her darkest hour of need.*^
On March 1, 19^5* President Roosevelt reported to
Congress on the Yalta Conference.

Senator Vandenberg, as

a long-time critic of the administration, came away uncon
vinced that progress had been achieved.

Because of the

treatment accorded to Poland, he considered publicly to de
nounce the Yalta agreements, but then decided to abide by
82

Foreign Relations: Yalta, p. 972.

QO
-'Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.), The Public Papers and Ad
dresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1944-^5 Vol*: Victory and
the Threshold o f Peace (New York: Harper and Brothers Pub
lishers, 1950), p. 564.
8^ I M d .. pp. 572- 57**.
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8<

the Roosevelt-Churchill f,stamp of approval." J

The Big Three themselves seemed to have sensed that
the road to continued cooperation in the postwar world would
be filled with obstacles.

As if to remind themselves, Chur

chill, Roosevelt and Stalin declared:
Only with continuing and growing co-operation
and understanding among our three countries and among
all the peace-loving nations can the highest aspira
tion of humanity be realized— a secure and lasting
peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Char
ter, ,fafford assurance that all men in all the lands
may live out their lives in freedom from fear and
want."*50
The Yalta Conference— so-called high tide of Allied u n i t y closed on this note.
^ Vandenberg Papers, p, 155-156,

86

Foreign Relations: Yalta, p, 9 75 .

CHAPTER III
FROM THE LAST WEEKS OF THE WAR TO THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE
)

MARCH TO AUGUST 19^5
SHAEF1s Berlin Decision
After the adjournment of the Yalta Conference, the
responsibility fell on the military for the concluding oper
ations of World War II,

The familiar pattern of statesmen

and politicians issuing military directives of strategic im
portance was reversed when General Eisenhower, the Supreme
Allied Commander in the European Theater of War, decided
against an Allied drive toward Berlin*

This fateful deci

sion was to be of lasting consequence in the ensuing politi
cal struggle between East and West.
Eisenhower^ judgment was based upon military evi
dence, fact as well as fiction.

The fact was that during

the last week of March, 19^5# the Allied Expeditionary For
ces had crossed the Rhine River and had encircled the Ruhr
pocket, Germanyfs most Important industrial area.3" So far,
the Anglo-American armies had advanced with breath-taking
^Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden
City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 194B’), p. 396.
Hereafter cited as Elsenhower, Crusade in Europe.
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50
speed.

Looking toward Berlin, still approximately three

hundred miles to the east, Eisenhower feared the logistic
problem which would result from outrunning his supplies,
should he venture to thrust a major spearhead toward the
German capital.

Since the Red Army had reached the Oder

River* only about thirty miles east of Berlin, he reasoned
that a race for Berlin was senseless.

The Soviet forces
2
were in a better position to capture the city.
The fictitious basis for Eisenhower^ decision, in
comparison to these sober facts, was much more intriguing.
American intelligence had supplied the Supreme Headquarters
of the Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) with reports of
Nazi planning for a so-called "National Redoubt" in the Ba
varian Alps.^

As a result of German propaganda calling for

ceaseless resistance, it was feared that after the defeat of
the German armed forces, Nazi elite troops would retreat to
the stronghold in an effort to prevent the inevitable— the
end of the Third Reich.

Eisenhower1s opinion in this matter

coincided with the assumption of American intelligence that
l±
prolonged guerilla fighting could result.
A fantastic in
telligence account, dated March 11, 19^5» stated the fol2Ibld.
^Jean Edward Smith, The Defense of Berlin (Baltimore,
Maryland; The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), P. 37• Hereafter
cited as Smith, The Defense of Berlin. See also Eisenhower,
Crusade in Europe, p. 397.
Il
Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 397*
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lowing:
Here [in the Bavarian mountains], defended by na
ture and by the most efficient secret weapons yet
invented, the powers that have hitherto guided Ger
many will survive to reorganize her resurrection;
here armaments will be manufactured in bomb-proof
factories, food and equipment will be stored in vast
underground caverns and specially selected corps
of young men will be trained in guerilla warfare, so
that a whole underground army can be fitted and di
rected to liberate Germany from occupying forces.*
The Supreme Allied Commander decided to spoil Germany*s at
tempt at harassing Allied efforts.^

Captured German offi

cers denied any knowledge of the "National Redoubt" which in
turn strengthened SHAEP*s belief in the existence of this
stronghold.^

Under these circumstances, Eisenhower "felt

it to be more than unwise, it . • • [would be] stupid" to go
8
for Berlin.
He decided instead to thrust his major drive
toward the south and to halt the Allied advance at the Elbe
River.

There, he would Join forces with the Russians.
To correlate his strategy with that of the Red Army,

Eisenhower informed Stalin of his plan.^

The Soviet Premier

oabled back agreeing with the General that Berlin had lost
its former strategic importance, and that he, too, would di^Smith, The Defense of Berlin, p. 37*
£
Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 397*
^Smith, Defense of Berlin, p. 37*
Q
Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 396.
9Ibld., p. 398.
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vert his forces toward the South,3,0

The answer was a typi

cal example of Communist deceit; the Kremlin leaders never
trusted theifc Western Allies.

As an expert in clouding the

Soviet Union*s postwar intentions but keeping these goals
always uppermost in mind, Stalin assumed the Allies adhered
to similar tactics.

He believed that Eisenhower*s message

was an attempt to divert the Red Army from its ultimate goal
of capturing Berlin, luring it southward instead.

The Sovi

et Marshals Georgi K. Zhukov and Ivan Stepanovich Koniev
were hastily recalled from the front for a Kremlin confer
ence.

Plying on the personal rivalry between the two,

Stalin ordered them to race their armies to Berlin.11
Stalin was not completely wrong in his disbelief of
Western blindness as to the importance of Berlin.

Eisen

hower* s decision was viewed with mingled feelings not only
among SHAEF*s staff but also at the highest governmental
levels in London and Washington.
Stalin caused quite a stir.

His correspondence with

While Eisenhower maintained

that his action had been within the range of his responsi
bility,12 British Prime Minister Churchill felt that the su
preme Allied Commander had overstepped the limits of his
10Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 460.
Ryan, The Last Battle, p. 252.

See also

■^Ryan, The Last Battle, pp. 243-244, 247, 249-251.

12

Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 399 •
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authority.^
Churchill viewed the Red Army's advance with deep
concern.
alms.

He recognized the need of checking Soviet imperial

The European map was a strategic chess board.

To

come out at least at par with the U.S.S.R. after the cessa
tion of hostilities, Churchill advocated to push as far east
as possible, making Berlin "the prime and true objective of
14
the Anglo-American armies.”
In an effort to win his American Allies over to his
viewpoint, Churchill sent a telegram to the American Chiefs
of Staff, emphasizing the political and psychological sig1<
nificance of Berlin. J But Washington stood firmly behind
Elsenhower.

President Roosevelt was half-amused, half-an

noyed by Churchill's pessimistic Interpretation of Russian
intentions.^
British Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, serv
ing under Eisenhower, shared Churchill's opinion.

Montgom

ery was ready to march on Berlin when the SHAEF order to
stop at the Elbe halted his drive.

To Eisenhower, Berlin

had become a mere "geographical location" in which he was
17
disinterested. r The: German capital was now devoid of par■^Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 458.

^ I b l d .. p. k$ 6 .

15rbld., p. k 6 li

*J^
Forrestal Diaries, pp. 36-37*
^Toland, The Last 100 Days, p. 325#
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tlcular importance, Eisenhower wrote in a message to General George C. Marshall,

and in a private conversation

with Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., Eisenhower
asked the laconic question:
Patton replied:

19

for you.” 7

“Well, who wants it [Berlin]?”

“I think history will answer that question

He was right.

However, at this stage of the discussion Elsenhower
won with his well-founded arguments that the Big Three, in
20
accepting the EAC draft of September 12, 1
9
had fixed
the Allied zones of occupation.

No matter how far the An

glo-American forces would advance eastward, they would have
to retreat to the zonal demarkation lines in order to honor
21
the agreement.
The Supreme Allied Commander “was prepared
to make an issue of it,” due to his belief in the “military
soundness” of his strategy.

22

The plan was adopted.

23

With

18

Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. *K)1.

^Toland, The Last 100 Days, p. 371*
20Supra, p. 32.

21

Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 399*

22ibia., p. 403.
23
-'Re-evaluating this fateful decision with the advan
tage of hindsight, both Churchill and U.S. Ambassador Murphy
came to a similar conclusion. The Prime Minister*s politi
cal arguments for a drive toward Berlin fell on unfertile
ground in Washington, since American foreign policy advisers
were paralyzed and without a leader, as a result of Presi
dent Roosevelt's rapidly failing strength. Therefore, the
military leaders had to make the decision.
They looked at
the problem from the point of view of the professional sol
dier, failing to grasp the political issue at stake. See:
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that the Soviets came an undreamed-of step closer to the
realization of their goal— the transformation of Germany
into another Russian satellite.
The Fall of Berlin and the
Soviet Interpretation of
Unconditional' Surrender '
The Battle of Berlin was launched by the Russians in
the middle of April, 19^5.

On May 2, the German armed for

ces, defending the city, surrendered to the Russians.

Thus,

the fierce struggle which had been characterized by savage
oh
street fighting, ended.
With the capture of the German capital, the Soviet
Union had achieved her primary objective— to be omnipotent
in the conquered territory.

Lenin*s dream of a Communist

revolution in Germany had never come true.

His heirs were

eager to tackle the task of fashioning her according to his
will. J

Defeated, her cities smoking rubble piles, her

people numbed by the horrors of war and of conquest, Germany
seemed to be a ripe fruit ready to be picked and to be put
into the Soviet basket.
Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. ^55»» and Murphy, Diplo
mat among Warriors. P. 2297
oh
For the most detailed and most vivid account of the
Battle of Berlin to date see: Ryan, The Last Battle.
^ St e f a n Brant, The East German Rising: 17th June 1953
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1955). P. 14. Hereafter cited
as Brant, The Bast German Rising.
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Preparations for the Communist take-over had been
elaborate*

The Soviet Military Administration (SMA) arrived

with detailed plans of how to rebuild Germany according to
26
the Communist pattern.
The mighty Red Army was considered
to be one of the most effective Soviet tools; propaganda was
another one.

Persuasive slogans such as "Hitlers come and

Hitlers go— the German people lives forever, J. V. Stalin,"

27

were plastered all over Russian occupied German territory. '
In order to appeal to the German national pride, the posters
were appropriately printed in black-white-red letters— the
traditional Prussian colors.
Even more effective than the SMA was a group of Ger
man Communists who had fled to the U.S.S.R. when Hitler came
to power.

In the Soviet Union, these German emigrants had

graduated from the toughest schools of Communist subversion.
Now, a selected group of ten under the guidance of Walter
Ulbricht^ slipped back into Berlin.-^0

It was their task to

start organizing a communist administration for the city.
"Group Ulbricht," as they were labeled, began its task the
26Ibld.

27Ibld., p. 13 .

28It>ld.
^Ulbrloht is the infamous leader of Moscow’s puppet
regime of the Soviet Zone in Germany. To date, he is the
only remaining Stalinist among the leaders of the Soviet
satellite states.

30

J Wolfgang Leonhard, Die Revolution entl&sst ihre Kin
der (Koln, Berlin: Kiepenhauer & Witsch, 1955)* P. 332.
Hereafter cited as Leonhard, Die Revolution entl&sst ihre
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day of the Berlin surrender— on May 2, 19^5

Backed by

the SMA and Marshal Zhukov’s order which called for the cre
ation of "anti-fascist” parties,^ Group Ulbricht located
old Communist comrades who were drafted for the cause.

33

Thus, adding members, the circle increased and "anti-fascist" cells developed in all of Berlin’s twenty boroughs.

3k

Moscow had issued definite instructions concerning
the make-up of "anti-fascist" borough administrations.

Ul

bricht ’s direotive advocated political patterns similar to
those during the time of the Weimar Republic,

This would

give a democratic appearance to the administrations. ^

How

ever, the departments of personnel, education, and interior
(police), and the first deputy mayor of every borough were
to be, in each instance, reliable communists.
was simple:

36

The scheme

It would seem to be democratic, yet all power

would be in communist hands. ^

Group Ulbricht accomplished

their task.
Kinder.
31Ibld., p. 3^8.
3 Beate Ruhm von Oppen (ed.)t Documents on Germany under Occupation: 19^5-195^ (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1 9 5 5 ) » PP* 37-38. Hereafter cited as Doc
uments on Germany under Occupation. See also Brant, The
East German Rising, p. l4.
•^Leonhard, Die Revolution entl^sst ihre Kinder, pp.
3 5 2 - 3 5 3 ,

3W

i

.

3W . ,

P« 355.

35Ibld.. pp. 356-357.

p. 357.

37Ibld.. p. 358.
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The First Soviet-Anglo-Amerlcan
Encounters In Berlin; An
Exercise In Biff Three
Cooperation
The fall of Berlin signified the end of World War II.
Six days later, on May 8 , 1945» the Chiefs of Staff of the
German Armed Forces High Command (OKW) signed the cap!tula38
tion document, thereby accepting Unconditional Surrender.
Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Admiral Hans-Georg Friedeburg,
and Colonel General Hans Jurgen Stumpff signed for the van
quished.

The United Nations were represented by Marshal of

the Soviet Union Zhukov and Marshal of the Royal Air Force
39
Sir Arthur Tedder, Eisenhower’s deputy at SHAEF. 7
A conflict arose among the victors at this first inter-Allled ceremony.

General Charles de Gaulle decided that

only Elsenhower could properly represent all of the West.
Since he had not come to Berlin, the French leader instruotlxA
ed General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny to sign for France.
This in turn caused U.S. General Carl Spaatz, who was also
present, to demand the right to sign the document for the
Li
United States.
The Russians stalled. Not until after
Walter Anger (ed.), Das Drltte Reich in Dokumenten
(Frankfurt am Mains Europaisohe Verlagsaristalt, 1957), p.
204.
39Ibld.
Toland., The Last 100 Days, p. 587.
43Tbld., p. 588.
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Marshal Zhukov had cleared the matter with Soviet Deputy
Foreign Commissar Andrei Vishinsky, could the document of
hfZ
surrender be signed.
Thus, World War II had come to an end— -at least in
Europe.

With the defeat of Germany, the issue which had

caused the East-West Alliance had ceased to exist.

Although

the disagreement prior to the signing of the Unconditional
Surrender of Germany had been only minor, it cast foreboding
shadows on the future.
Nearly another month passed until the Allies offi
cially assumed responsibility for the government of Ger
many.^

A meeting of the Allied Commanders was held in Ber

lin on June 5» 19^5* to sign the^Declaration Regarding
[the] Assumption of Supreme Authority by [the] Allied Pow
ers

At the same meeting, them'stat ement on Zones of Occu

pation in GermanjA^ and the^Statement on Control Machinery
in German/^ which were omitted from the Yalta communique,^
A2

Ibid.
Zi.3
^Redvers Ople et a l M The Search for Peace Settle
ments (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1951)*
pp. 69-70. Hereafter cited as Opie et, al., The Search for
Peace Settlements.
^ B a s l o American Documents. 19*J*l-^9» PP* 506-507*
^Ibld.. p. 512.
Il£
Berlin Documents, pp. 30-31*
^ Supra. p.
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were released to the press.

48

The treatment accorded to Western zonal commanders
upon their arrival in Berlin for the June 5 meeting revealed
a typical Soviet trait— unpoliteness.

To their annoyance,

the generals had to wait for hours to sign these documents;
49
the Soviets failed to explain the delay. y Eventually,
Eisenhower and Montgomery lost their patience.

They noti

fied Zhukov that they would leave Berlin unless the meeting
was immediately convened.
result:

This action produced a startling

Without further postponement the conference be

gan,-^ and the documents were signed.
Having completed the ceremony, Elsenhower suggested
to Zhukov to initiate proceedings leading toward the estab
lishment of the Control Council.

Eisenhower intended to

leave his deputy, General Lucius D. Clay and his political
adviser, Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, in Berlin, along with
a small staff who could prepare the American entry into the
48

The zones of occupation were those projected by the
EAC draft agreement of September 12, 1944. Supra, p. 32.
The control machinery, i.e. Control Council and Kommandatura, were adopted as planned by the EAC draft agreement of
November 14, 1944. Supra, p. 35*
^ Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1950)» PP* 21-22.
Hereafter cited as Clay, Decision in Germany, See also
Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p . 436.
-^Montgomery, Viscount Bernard, The Memoirs of Mont
gomery of Alameln (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1958")",
P. 338*
-*^Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 22.
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city.-^

Zhukov did not approve of the proposal.

Obviously,

the Soviet Military Governor was not authorized to make a
decision without specific instructions from Moscow.

Sup

ported by Vishinsky, his political adviser, Zhukov argued
that American withdrawal to the zonal lines of demarkation
would be a prerequisite to Western entry into Berlin.
Eisenhower did not insist on his proposal.

He agreed to ar

ranging the Western entry into Berlin simultaneously to the
withdrawal from the Soviet zone.
In this first meeting of the Allied military gover
nors, the Western leaders gained nothing but a foretaste of
what peacetime cooperation with the Soviets would be like.
The U.S.S.H. by contrast, boosted her prestige.

From now

on, the SMA could refer to inter-Allied documents as the
basis for its claim to unlimited power; yet, as long as they
were the sole occupation force in Berlin, the Soviets could
openly pursue their policy of communist subversion.
The first American military party leaving for the
German capital, was a reconnaissance force led by Colonel
^Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 258.
Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 22.

See also

-^Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 258. See also
Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 23.
About one third of the Soviet zone, large portions
of Thuringia, Saxony and Mecklenburg, had been overrun by
Anglo-American forces, before the drive was halted. At this
point, they still held the territory.
<U,
J Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 23.
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Prank L* Howley,-^ who was to gain fame as the American com
mandant of Berlin*

Starting from the city of Halle at day

break of June 17» 19^5» the Americans had to cover approxi
mately 120 miles.

Their journey was not over until long af-

ter dark, and they did not reach their destination*

When

Howley set out, he commanded a column of about 500 officers
and men and 120 vehicles; upon arrival, his force had dwin57
died to exactly 37 officers, 50 vehicles, and 175 men*
Just six weeks before, the Americans and the Rus
sians had been fighting a common enemy*

Now, the Soviets

saw fit to harass the mighty Western Ally*

They caused the

failure of Colonel Howleyfs reconnaissance mission*

Being

the first U.S. troops to plunge into territory held by the
Red Army, they were ready to expect the unexpected.

Never

theless, the Russians held a surprise for them.
Hardly had the Americans crossed into Red Army ter
ritory, when their convoy was stopped by a road block. ^
This was the beginning of the endless delay.

At first, the

Russians camouflaged their intentions by inviting Howley to
a victory celebration.

When the latter grew restive, anx

ious to go on with his mission, his Soviet counterpart drop
ped the friendly mask.

Resorting to a favorite Soviet tech

-^Frank L. Howley, Berlin Command (New York; G. P*
Putnam*s Sons, 1950)# p. 26* Hereafter cited as Howley,
Berlin Command*
56Ibld., pp. 27, 34.
58ibia.. p. 29.

57Ibld.. pp. 27, 30-32.
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nique, the Russian alluded to ffformalities" which had to be
taken care of.-^

jje cited an obscure agreement that sup

posedly limited an American force to 37 officers, 50 vehi
cles, and 175 men*

Helplessly exposed to Soviet whimsy,

Howley had no choice but to cut down the number of his force
accordingly.

Then he was given permission to proceed.

Russian guided the convoy.

A

But instead of using the four-

lane Autobahn, leading directly to Berlin, the Russian guide
61
followed cobble-stoned, secondary country roads.
In Babelsberg, a little town about ten miles south
west of Berlin, the trip ended.

The Americans were brought

to a compound near Potsdam which was readied for the soon to
be held last Big Three conference.

Kept "virtual prisoners"

in this restricted environment, they were supposed to assist
in the renovation of the compound.
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Since reconnaissance

men were not of much use in this particular enterprise, How
ley arranged to have them replaced by housekeeping troops.^
When the exchange of personnel was completed, Howley left
for Halle to rejoin his unit.

His first encounter with

the Russians had been unpleasant, although it had been in
dicative of the Soviet attitude toward the Western Allies.
If it appeared for a while as if the Soviet Union
59Ibid.,

pp. 29-30 .

Ibid..pp. 30-32.

6lIbld., p. 32.

62Ibid.,p. 3^.

°3Ibld..

6^Ibld..p. 1*1.

p. 36.
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was unwilling to embark upon the stormy sea of inter-Allied
administration, then this interpretation of Soviet thinking
was wrong.

The U.S.S.R. could have chosen to consolidate

her conquered eastern European empire by clamping down the
,firon curtain” at the western-most point of Red Army ad
vance.

To honor, at least outwardly, the Big Three agree

ments meant to leave a loophole in the otherwise perfectly
tight Communist grip on the overrun territories.

Weighing

the issues at stake, the Kremlin leaders* imperial ambi
tions won out.

The Soviets wanted to add the rich German

provinces of Saxony and Thuringia to their occupation zone.
In exchange for them, the Russians were willing to admit the
West to Berlin.
For the same reason that the Soviets decided in fav
or of adhering to the agreements, Churchill was against it.
He argued that to withdraw the American Army to the zonal
lines of demarkation would be equivalent to handing over to
the communists an additional 120 mile deep strip on a bOO
mile long fron t . ^

He wrote to British Foreign Secretary

Sir Anthony Eden:
Thus the territories under Russian control would in
clude the Baltic provinces, all of Germany to the
occupational line, all Czechoslovakia, a large part
of Austria, the whole of Yougoslavia, Hungary, Ru
mania, [_an(i] Bulgaria, . . .
It would include all
the great capitals of Middle Europe, including Ber
lin, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and
Ax
-'Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 502.
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Sofia.
Urging U. S. President Harry S. Truman ( to re-evaluate
the situation and not to withdraw the American troops,

68

Churohill made a last attempt to stem the Soviet tide.

The

new President decided to abide by the Three Power agreements
which had, after all, been negotiated under the auspices of

69

his predecessor and the British Prime Minister. 7
The issue was settled in mid-June 19^5* when Truman
70
and Stalin exchanged telegrams on this subject.
American
withdrawal from the Soviet zone of occupation was to be con
current to the movement of the Western forces to Berlin.
Truman also asked for "provision of free access for
United States Forces by air, road and rail to Berlin from
Frankfurt and Bremen.11^

Trumanfs telegram to Stalin was .

the only written evidence of the Western powers* claim to
the right of free access to and from the city.

Stalin did

not mention the point in his answer, but since the troop re66Ibld.. pp. 502-503.
^Truman succeeded to the presidency, when Roosevelt
died on April 12, 19^5 • See Leahy, I Was There, p.

68

Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 301*

69Ibld.. p. 303.
^U.S.S.R., Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stalin*s Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman;
1941-^5 (New York: E, P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1958)* PP*
2 b 5 -2 b 8 .
*^1bid., p. 2^5.
P. 303.

See also Truman, Year of Decisions,
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alignment was the result of these Soviet-American cables,
his consent was implied.
To make final arrangements for the troop transfer,
General Clay and his British colleague Lieutenant General
Sir Ronald Weeks flew to Berlin for a conference with Mar-

72

shal Zhukov.(

It was agreed to begin the transfer on July

1, which would permit the Americans to enter the German cap
ital on Independence D a y . ^

Verbal agreement was reached on

free Western access to Berlin.

One railroad line, one major

highway (Autobahn), and two air corridors were allocated to
the Western A l l i e s . ^
On July 4, 19^5» Colonel Howley, as deputy of the
first commandant of the U.S. sector, Major General Floyd
Parks, was ready to take over the American sector of Berlin.
Friction developed with the Soviets.

In an attempt to delay

action, Zhukov sent the following note to General Parks:
In view of the fact that Berlin is to be ruled by an
Allied Kommandatura and that Kommandatura is not yet
set up, your sector will not be turned over to you
until the Kommandatura is set up.'-5
Parks and Howley decided to ignore the Soviet breach of the
Truman-Stalin agreement and to go ahead and to take over

72
' Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 24.
73Ibld.. p. 25.
7**Ibid., p. 26.

See also Truman, Year of Decisions,

P. 307.

73Howley, Berlin Command, pp. 47-^8.
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their sector, anyway*

The commandant cautioned his deputy.:

MDonft get into too much trouble.

76

is Just beginning.11'

After all, the occupation

Moving in at daybreak, Howley and his

men set up the Office of American Military Government, unit
ed States (OMGUS).^

The Russians were faced with a fait

78

accompli.'

On July 7* 19^5» the Allied military governors had
another session*

At this meeting, the Inter-Allied Military

79

Kommandatura was formally established.''

Thereafter* inter-

Allied accord was temporarily exhausted.
A dispute developed over the problem of supplying
Berlin with food and coal.

The capital had always drawn its

major food supply from the surrounding farm belt and the
east German provinces.

Therefore, SHAEF had assumed that

the task of feeding Berlin would be a Soviet responsibility.
Now, Clay and Weeks were confronted with Zhukov* s categori
cal refusal to bring in food for the Western sectors.

As

far as coal was concerned, the Soviet Marshal demanded that
80
the city be supplied by Ruhr coal.
Bound by the clause of the EAC agreement that Con^ Ibld., pp. 48-^9.
many, p. 31 .

See also Clay, Decision in Ger

?7ibia.. p. 49.
78ibia.. p. 50,
79
'^Documents on Germany under Occupation, p. 39.
So

Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 27-28.
Berlin Command, pp. 57-59*

See also How-

68
0*1

trol Council decisions would have to be unanimous,
military governors had to reach a compromise.

the

They did.

Clay agreed to bringing in the food for the American sector,
Weeks promised coal from the Ruhr, and Zhukov gratiously
consented to furnish “some brown coal and hydroelectric power , • , from eastern Germany,"

82

Having scored a major

victory, Zhukov adjourned the meeting.®^
The next meeting with the Russians took place on
July 11, 1948,

As it turned out, it was the first session
84
of the Kommandatura;
the commandants signed their first

order.^

With this document, the Western governments indi

rectly consented to Soviet action in Berlin.

These were the

most important parts of the order:
Until special notice, all existing regulations and
ordinances issued by the Commander of the Soviet Ar
my Garrison and Military Commandant of . . . Berlin
and by the German administration Bgder Allied con
trol . . , shall remain in force. 5
Unknowingly, the Western powers had approved Of subversive
elements suoh as Group Ulbricht and the likes.
The first proclamation of the Control Council, is-

81Supra. p. 35.
82

Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 28-29.

^Howley, Berlin Command, p. 59•

8\bld., p. 61.
•^Berlin Documents, p. ^ 6 .

86

Ibid.

See also Howley, Berlin Command, p. 61.
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sued after the opening session on July 30, 19^5» was less
dramatic.®^

It merely reiterated the points of the State-

ment on Control Machinery in Germany of June 5* 19^5*

88

Four days before the first formal meeting of the
Control Council, France had finally been admitted to the ex
tremely exclusive Allied club.

The EAC protocol of Septem

ber 12, 1944, had been amended to include France in the
agreement.^

Already at Yalta, a zone and a sector of occu-

<50

pation had been allotted to her ;7

with the EAC amendment of

July 26, 1945, France became a full-fledged member of the
Control Council and of the Kommandatura.

Thus, nearly three

months after V-E Day, the Four Powers were set jointly to
administer Germany.
The Potsdam Conference:
July7 16-August 27 19^5
Mounting friction among the Allies had increased ev
er since the last weeks of the war in Europe.

President

Truman was faced with the tremendous task of familiarizing
himself not only with his new job as President of the United
States but also with the problems of international arrange
ments, inherited from his predecessor.
^ Berlln Documents, p. 47 •

8^Supra. p. 59.
^ Berlin Documents, pp. 33-34.
9°supra, p. 46.

Soon it became evi-
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dent that the impending break could only be avoided If the
Big Three could work out agreements at another top-level
conference.
To sound out the Allies and to prepare for this me
eting, Truman appointed Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt*s personal
adviser, and former American ambassador to the U.S.S.R. Jo
seph E. Davies, as presidential emissaries to Moscow and
London, respectively .^1

Hopkins and Davies went on their

missions during the last week of May, 19^5«

92

The primary purpose of Hopkins* mission to Moscow
was to Impress upon Stalin the fact that the change in U.S.
presidents did not entail a revision of American attitude
toward the Soviet Union.
sevelt *s policies.93

Truman intended.to adhere to Roo

Hopkins was a good choice for talks

with the Soviet dictator.

As the late president*s personal

friend, Hopkins was able to create a warm atmosphere in his
conversations with Stalin.

Hopkins mentioned Roosevelt*s

confidence after Yalta “that the United States and the SoviQk
et Union could work together in peace as they had in war.”^
Turning to the sticky problem of Poland, where the Sovietbacked Lublin government was rapidly erasing the last rem
nants of democracy, Stalin and Hopkins expressed differing
91
7 Truman, Year of Decisions, pp. 110, 258-259.

92Ibld.. pp. 259-260.

93Ibld.. p. 258.

Qll
7 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 888.
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opinions.

Hopkins outlined the American principle of the

four freedoms.

To Stalin, these were abstract ideas which

could not be realized as long as the situation warranted ab
solute p e a c e . B u t

the Soviet Premier agreed to a Big

Three Conference to settle the East-West problems.

He in

sisted upon the area of Berlin as a meeting place for the
proposed conference.

July 15» 19^5# was accepted by both

the Soviet Union and the United States as the target date.
The meeting was to be held in Potsdam, a suburb of Berlin.

o6

The purpose of Davies* mission to London was to
smooth the ruffled feathers of the British Prime Minister.
Churchill*s suspicions of Soviet intentions had increased
over the years.

With the end of the war in Europe, he felt

that the common denominator between the Soviet union on the
one side and the United States and Great Britain on the oth
er had vanished.

To make the bill come out right, he advo

cated a radical revision of Western policy toward the
U.S.S.R.

Most important, he thought, was the maintenance

of the Western armed forces in Europe.

Demobilization

should not set in before differences with the Soviet union
^Ibid., p. 906.
pp. 262-263.

See also Truman, Year of Decisions,

^Leahy, I Was There, p. 382. See also Truman, Year
of Decisions, p. 263. Potsdam had a special historical and
symbolic meaning. In a more glorious time of German his
tory, it had been the residence of-famous Prussian kings,
such as Frederick the Great.
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had been settled.^

Churchill specifically opposed a West-

98
ern retreat to the projected zones of occupation.x
Davies disagreed with Churchill.

The American envoy

insisted that strict adherence to the Yalta and EAC agree
ments provided the only possible road to cooperation with
the Soviets and hence a peace settlement for the postwar
world.^
tude.

The Prime Minister retained his pessimistic atti

Passionately, he argued for his point-of-view; he was

most disturbed by Russia*s application of police state tac
tics in the submission of countries under Red Army occupa
tion.^^

Davies was frustrated with Churchill*s continued

opposition to America*s expressed wish to get along with the
Russians.

In an effort to convert Churchill to a more len

ient view of the U.S.S.R., he told him:
I [DaviesJ said that frankly, as I had listened
to him [ChurchillJ inveigh so violently against the
threat of Soviet domination and the spread of Commu
nism in Europe, and disclose such a lack of confi
dence in the professions of good faith in Soviet
leadership, I had wondered whether he, the Prime Min
ister, was now willing to declare to the world that
he and Britain had made a mistake in not supporting
^Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp.
9^U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States; Diplomatic Papers: We'Conference of Berlin
(The Potsdam Conference): 19^5. Departmentof State Publica
tion No. 7OI 5 , Vol. I (2 Vols.; Washington: United States
Government Printing Office, i960), p. 67* Hereafter cited
as Foreign Relations: Potsdam.
^Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 261.
^00Leahy, I Was There, p. 378.

73
Hitler, for as I understood him, he was now express
ing the doctrine which Hitler and Goebbels had been
proclaiming and reiterating for the past four years
in an effort to break up allied unity and ’divide
and conquer,1 Exactly the same conditions which he
described and the same deductions were drawn from
them as he now appeared to assert,101
Churchill, aware of the fact that England’s position as a
world power was subordinate to that of the United States,
relented.

In spite of maintaining that he pursued a harder

line toward the U.S.S.R., he promised to support the united
States in her effort to seek a solution to the differences
102
which beset the Big Three alliance.
The Potsdam Conference, last of the Big Three meet
ings, took place from July 16 to August 2, 1 9 4 5 Prime
Minister Churchill had suggested the code name TERMINAL,

104

meant to symbolize the successful conclusion of the war in
Europe,

It came to reach a much deeper meaning, for the

Potsdam Conference represented the end of one era and the
beginning of another.

Most obvious was the change in lead

Forelgn Relations: Potsdam, p, 73• See also Leahy,
I Was There, pp. 378-379. Not only in the light of postwar
developments but also In view of Western reaction to the
outbreak of World War II, Davies* statement was stunning,
Great Britain, after all, had been the first to declare war
on Germany, While the Soviets made the Hitler-Stalin pact,
the United States waited until after Pearl Harbor to get in
to the war,
102Leahy, I Was There, p. 380.
1Q3Ibld.. p. 39*K
104
Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 333•
Diplomat among Warriors, p . 2 7 9 V "

See also Murphy,
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ership.

President Truman occupied Roosevelts chair; Clem

ent R. Attlee replaced Churchill as British Prime Minister
midway through the conference, following the latter*s defeat
in the general elections.10-’ TERMINAL also signified the
end of naziism and f&soism and the beginning of a new
lo 6
order.
Finally, the Conference symbolized the end of the
Big Three Ailianoe.

Completing the hot war they had fought

together, they initiated the cold war fighting one an
o t h e r . C h u r c h i l l later redubbed the Conference’s code
names he called It FRUSTRATION.108
The Prime Minister’s disillusionment was understand
able.

No progress was made.

In order to come up with some

results, agreements had to be so much watered down by com
promise that they became utterly ineffective.

Truman left

-’Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 395* See also Leahy,
I Was There, p. 41'/. Although there was no perceptible
change in British policies at Potsdam, the excitement that
had characterized the Stalin-Churchill exchanges was mis
sing. The Soviets were cool and condescending in their
treatment of Attlee and his party. See Murphy, Diplomat
among Warriors, pp. 275-276; and Leahy, I Was There, p. 419.
"Io 6
Unfortunately, this new order failed to bring peace
to the world. Soviet subversive actions were in full swing,
while the Potsdam Conference was in session. The SMA or
dered the confiscation of private property and initiated the
land reform leading to the establishment of the collective
farm system in the Soviet zone of Germany. Sees Klimov, The
Terror Machine, p. 125. At the same time, Communist indoc
trination courses were held weekly, all over the Soviet
zone. See: Leonhard, Die Revolution entl&sst ihre Kinder,
P. 417.
^^Smith, The Defense of Berlin, p. 90.
*1 A Q

Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 668.
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Potsdam resolved never again to expose himself to the an109
noying Soviet taotios at the conference table.
The first controversial subject to be discussed at
Potsdam was Poland.

At Yalta, the Western leaders had no

choice but to accept the Soviet-backed Polish Provisional
Government; at Potsdam the Western Allies were confronted
with another Soviet fait accompli--the extension of Poland
to the Oder-Neisse Line.^^

Truman charged the Russians

with violating the Yalta agreement by setting up a separate
Polish zone of occupation.

Stalin defended the action by

maintaining that the Poles were only helping the Red Army to
administer the territory.

111

Although the Soviet dictator

insisted that all Germans had fled the area, the President
and the Prime Minister were concerned with the fate of the
112
nine million Germans who had inhabited the land.
Since
an agreement was Impossible, the three heads of government
reverted to the Yalta decisions

"Final delimitation of the

western frontier of Poland should await the peace settle
^^Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 279#
James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York and
London: Harper & Brothers Putlishers, 1$ h7 ). P* 79* Here
after cited as Byrnes, Speaking Frankly. See also Leahy,
I Was There, p. k06.
■^^Truman, Year of Decisions, pp. 367-368.

13~^Ibld.. p. 369*
Tragedy, pp. 658-659.

See also Churohill, Triumph and
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m e n t . " ^^

Indirectly, the Western Allies consented to the

annexation of the German land east of the Oder-Neisse Line.
The Potsdam protocol provided for the "orderly and humane"
transfer of Germans from those territories to the four
Hk
Allied zones of occupation.
Following Yalta, the idea to dismember Germany had
been dropped.

The plan jointly to administer Germany in

matters affecting the whole country was adopted instead.
Reiterating the Yalta proposal, the Control Council was dell6
signated to govern.
Thus, the Potsdam protocol was mere
ly a repetition of Allied principles, a guide for the Con
trol Council to be used as a basis for their deliberations.
No specific mention was made of the status of Berlin.
ously, this had been considered unnecessary.
ments were quite specific.

Obvi

The EAC agree-

117

'

Opposition to the dismemberment of Germany was wel
comed by the Kremlin leaders for a number of reasons.

For

one thing, the propaganda value was not to be underestima
^ ^ Berlin Documents, p. 40.
Frankly."'p. 81.
U W

.

See also Byrnes, Speaking

, p. M .

11*5

^Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace; The Potsdam Con
ference (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
I960) , P* 236. Hereafter cited as Feis, The Potsdam Confer
ence.
116
Berlin Documents, p. 38Joachim Rottmann, Per Vierm&chte— Status Berlins
(Bonn, Berlin: Bundesministerlum ftir gesamtdeutsche Fragen,
1959). P. 16.
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ted.

The Soviets knew that the Germans feared dismemberment.

Mixing truth with lies, Stalin declared in his victory
speech that the Soviet Union had no intention "to dismember
11 8
or to destroy Germany.”
A more important reason for
Russian opposition to dismemberment was of economic nature.
Soviet reparation claims and participation in the anticapated international administration of the Ruhr!s industrial
area had a better chance to be realized if Germany was governed as a unit.

110
-

The Soviet Union ran into unexpected strong opposi
tion when the discussion turned to the question of repara
tions.

Basing their claim for ten billion dollars on the

Yalta protocol, the Soviet leaders had to be reminded that
this sum had been aocepted as a basis for discussion only.

120

The problem could not be solved.

the Control Council for deliberation.

It was referred to

121

Probably the most important Potsdam decision was the
agreement to treat Germany "as a single economic unit."

122

Since the heads of government could not agree at Potsdam,
their representatives on the Control Council could hardly be
118

Peis, The Potsdam Conference, p. 238.

^■^Meissner, Russland, die Weltm&chte und Deutschland.
P. 70.
1
120
Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 39*
121
Berlin Documents, p. 39*
122Ibld.. p. 38.
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expected to be more successful.

Yet, this provision bound

the military governors to the often exasperating, always fu
tile attempt to act in unison— an Impossible task.
Realizing that the Big Three could not reach agree
ments at Potsdam, they reverted to their favorite method—
postponement.

For this purpose, the Council of Foreign Min-

isters was set up with a permanent seat In London.

123

The

foreign ministers were to continue the negotiations for a
peace settlement.

France and China were invited to join.

Together the nations might work out their outstanding dif12U
ferences.
The Potsdam Protocol was held in general terms, for
there was no agreement on specific i s s u e s . A

poor guide

for Allied policy, it failed to look toward the future, but
instead was based upon the assumption that Allied unity was
a reality.

But this had become a dream of the past by the
12^
time the Big Three met at Potsdam.
Subsequent events in

Berlin were an outgrowth of the East-West split.

The Big

Three leaders had not been able to bridge the gap.
^2^Berlln Documents, p. 3^.
124Xbld.. p. 35.
12*5
•^Ratchford and Ross, Berlin Reparations Assignment,
p. kk.
J. P. Nettl, The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in
Germany: 19^5-50 (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford Univer
sity Press, 1951), p. 5*K Hereafter cited as Nettl, The
Ea st ern Zone•

CHAPTER IV
BERLIN— MICROCOSM OF POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS.
1945 - 19A9
The Inter-Allled Administration
of Berlin: 19^5-19^7
World War II had brought Germany to the brink of ob
livion.

Not since the Napoleonic Wars had battles scorched

her soil.

Now, the devastation was worse than anything ever
n
experienced before.
The degree of destruction in Berlin

was particularly high, partly as a result of Allied bomb
ings, and partly due to heavy Soviet artillery shelling during the Battle of Berlin.

2

Troops of the Western Allies on

their arrival in the German capital were stunned by the ex
tent of the destruction.

To remove the rubble, it was es

timated, would take sixteen years, using 11ten trains a day,
Alfred Grosser, The Colossus Again: West Germany
from Defeat to Rearmament,'trans. Richard Rees [New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1955)» P* 57* Hereafter
cited as Grosser, The Colossus Again.
2
Edgar Mclnnis, Richard Hiscocks, and Robert Spencer,
The Shaping of Postwar Germany (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1960), p . lO3. Hereafter cited as Mclnnis
et al., The Shaping of Postwar Germany. See also Ratchford
and Ross, Berlin Reparations Assignment, p. ty.
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of fifty wagons each.”*^ The appearance was misleading.
Life emerged from underneath the smoking ruins.

Yet, long

before the outer destruction scarred, Berlin underwent a
spiritual rebirth which restored to the Germans an honora
ble place among the peoples of the world.

In the ensuing

East-West struggle, Berlin came to symbolize man*s eternal
ji,
quest for freedom.
It was only when the Western powers took over their
sectors of occupation, that the Berliners began to reoover
from the shock of the Soviet conquest.

At first, they were

fascinated observers of the drama of inter-Allled administration.-' Soon, they themselves entered the stage and like
the chorus in a Greek tragedy, added substance to the play
making their appraisal of the principal actors.
nations assumed the role of the underdog.

6

The Western

The Soviets had

prepared the basis for the division of Germany while they

3

^Mclnnis et al.. The Shaping of Postwar Germany, p.
103.
b

Infra, p. 111.

^Wolfgang G. Friedmann, The Allied Military Govern
ment of Germany (Londons Stevens and Sons Ltd., 19^7), p.
21. Hereafter cited as Friedmann, The Allied Military Gov
ernment of Germany,
z
Completing the analogy to a Greek tragedy, Aristot
le’s definition of a hero is noteworthy. According to the
philosopher, the hero’s misfortune is brought down upon him
by himself due to an "error in judgment.” also known as the
‘‘tragic flaw.” The tragedy Is an unexpected result of the
“error in judgment.”
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were sole rulers of Berlin,

7

During this time, communica

tions with the Western powers concerning joint Allied conQ

trol were praotioally non-existent.

Once the Inter-Allied

machinery had been set up, it became evident that the sepa
rately developed plans were so divergent that combined administration was vitally hampered from the very beginning.

o

Subsequent developments resulted not so much from the policy
of any one of the Allies toward Germany but were conditioned
by the inter-Allied character of the occupation.

10

The quadripartite adventure of inter-Allied adminis
tration lacked harmony from the very outset.

The forms of

disagreement ranged from verbal battles to physical fights.
At the top level, the military governors fought verbally;
the disputes were more pronounced in the Kommandatura; bul
lets settled many arguments among the soldiers during a per
iod of adjustment.

After the Americans had first taken over

their sector, they got an alarming number of German calls,
asking for help.

Russian soldiers, not quite realizing that

the days when Berlin was completely at their mercy were ov
er, returned frequently to the Western sectors for their fa'’supra, pp. 55-57.
Q
Friedmann, The Allied Military Government of Ger
many. p. 15.

9ibia.
Harold Zink, The united States In Germany; 19^-1955
(Princeton, New Jersey, Toronto, London, New York: D. Van
Nostrand Company, Inc., 1957)» P* 103.
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vorite pastime— looting, raping, and killing at will.

To

stop them, Americans, failing to get the message across in
any other way, occasionally had to make use of their weap
ons,

These incidents raised a furor with the SMA, but the

violence did not cease until the Russians ordered their soldiers to, remain within the Soviet sector of Berlin.

11

In spite of these disturbances, the first year of
inter-Allied administration was relatively successful.

Ow

ing to Increasing Western needs of access routes to Berlin,
the Control Council reached agreement on November 30, 19^5*
to allot another air corridor to the West, thus raising the
number to three*

12

Previous agreements regarding Pranco-An-

glo-American access rights to and from the capital had fall13
ed to produce a written guarantee from the Soviets. ^
Therefore, the Control Council amendment was of tremendous
importance.

It stated specifically: "Plight over these

routes will be conducted without previous notice being glvl/i

en, by aircraft of the nations governing Germany.”
Soviets had made their first major mistake.

The

With the air

11
Howley, Berlin Command, pp. 66-72.

12

Lyman M. Tondel, Jr. (ed.), The Issues in the Berlln-German Crisis (Dobbs Perry, New York: Oceana Publica
tions, Inc., 1963), p. 7. Hereafter cited as Tondel, The
Issues in the Berlin-German Crisis.
^ Supra, pp. 32,66,
Ik
Tondel, Jr* (ed*). The Issues in the Berlin-German
Crisis, p. 7 ,
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corridor amendment they provided the West with the means to
combat communist strangulation attempts*
Berlin represented the first stage in the Soviets'
political plan to create a central communist government for
Germany*

In establishing city and borough administrations

before the Western powers arrived, they hoped to gain the
support of the population,^

This chance was irreparably

damaged by the behavior of the Red Army soldiers after the
fall of the city.

The German Communist Party (KPD) was as

sociated in people's minds with the SMA, and all the horrors
that Russian rule brought to Berlin,

16

Evaluating the situation, the Soviets realized that
drastic action had to be taken in order to sway events in
their f a v o r T h e

Moscow-trained German communists, in

collaboration with the SMA, decided to eliminate the KPD's
ift
strongest competitor— the Social Democratic Party (SPD),
The forceful merger of the two labor parties into one, the
so-called Socialist Unity Party (SED), was to ensure Commu^Philip Windsor, City on Leave; A History of Berlin:
19^5-1962 (Londons Chatto & Wlndus, 19&3)» PP. 50-51* Here
after cited as Windsor, City on Leave,

16

Edward H, Litchfield et al., Governing Postwar Ger
many (Ithaca, New York: CornelT University Press, 1953)» P*
15^* Hereafter cited as Litchfield et al., Governing Post
war Germany.

17

fBrant, The East German Rising, p. 15.

18Ibid.

84
IQ
nlst predominance at the polls. 7

It was a poor camouflage.

Social Democrats recognized that the merger would
mean annihilation.

Having secured Kommandatura permission

to hold a referendum, they Inflicted a crushing defeat on
220
1
the Communists.
In spite of the unanimous Kommandatura
decision to allow party members to vote on the issue, the
SMA saw fit to bar voters from the polls in the Soviet sec
tor.

Threats and arrests in East Berlin only helped to

highlight the result of the referendum In West Berlin:

Ov

er eighty percent of the Social Democrats rejected the amalgamatlon with the Communists.

21

Stubbornly pursuing their

policy, the Communists held a convention, in April 1946,
Joining the SPD turncoats and the KPD into a new Communist
Party— the SED.22
Subsequently, both the SPD splinter group and the
newly created SED asked for Inter-Allied recognition without
which they were not permitted to operate.
rocked the Kommandatura.

A major struggle

The Soviet commandant, General

Alexander Kotikov, opposed the recognition of the rump-SPD
on grounds that the party was now a part of the SED.

The

^Litchfield et al.. Governing Postwar Germany, p.
15**.
20

Howley, Berlin Command, p. 105.

21

Litohfleld et al., Governing Postwar Germany, p.

155*

22rbld.
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Western commandants refused to go along with this concept*
Hopelessly deadlocked, the commandants referred the question
to the military governors•

The Control Council sent it

straight back to the Kommandatura.

In the end, after pro

longed dispute, the commandants decided to acknowledge both
23
parties. J
A similar procedure was followed when the Kommanda
tura failed to agree on a date for the first city-wide, free
elections to be held in postwar Berlin.

Ever since March

19^6, Colonel Howley had pleaded for municipal elections.
Just as consistently, the proposal had been rejected by Gen
eral Kotikov.

After the question had been referred to the

Control Council for aotion, the idea was adopted by the Sov2/j,
lets.
General of the Army Vassily Sokolovsky, Zhukov1s
successor as Soviet military governor, was better Informed
on the political trends of the Kremlin.

Apparently, the

Soviets were not yet prepared to completely abandon Western
principles.^

On August 13, 19^6, the Kommandatura approved

a temporary constitution for the City of Berlin.

26

It re

turned to its citizens the basic democratic right of politi
cal self-determination.

The constitution was to become ef-

^Howley, Berlin Command, pp. 106-110.
2Vbld., pp. 119-121.
^Litchfield et al.. Governing Postwar Germany, p.
157.
26

Berlin Documents, pp* ^8-50.
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fective after the October elections*

27

The elections were a unique experience.

Internal

politics were unimportant, since a more significant issue
28
was at stake— communism versus democracy.
Only seventeen
months after the defeat of Germany, the vanquished had the
opportunity to pass Judgment on the victors.

29

• The result

of the voting would clearly reflect the attitude of the Ber
liners toward the occupying powers.

Both sides were aware

of the implications.
Having lost prestige in the SPD referendum, the Com
munists were particularly anxious to score a victory.
their endeavors were supported by the SMA.

All

Their vast prop

aganda machine was set in motion, displaying the full range
from persuasion to intimidation.

Pood and electricity were

30
used as political m e a n s r
the Americans were accused of
27Ibld.. p. U-8.
28
Howley, Berlin Command, p. 118.
29
7Friedmann, The Allied Military Government of Ger
many, p. 22.
-^The Soviets distributed extra food rations to the
Soviet sector in an attempt to convey the image of Communist
generosity as compared to the regular, low rations in the
Western sectors. Berliners got their first taste of Husslan
tactics when the Soviet sporadically shut off the electri
city-fifty percent originated in the Soviet zone— in order
to blame the Western Allies of inefficiency in supplying
their sectors with energy. See Howley, Berlin Command, pp.
122-123.
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31
looting their zone;-' and the parties which tended toward
32
the West were subdued in the Soviet sector*
The Soviets
forgot only one things
suspicious.

Too much propaganda made the Germans

Their dismal situation was a result of their

belief in the wrong leaders; they would not make the same
33
mistake twice♦ ^
Up to this point, the United States had maintained a
detached attitude.

American leaders had been reluctant to

get involved in what they considered matters of purely Ger
man concern.

Now, exactly fourteen months after the Ameri

can entry into Berlin, the time for counter-measures had
come.

On September

19^6, RIAS (Radio in the American

Sector) began broadcasting from Berlin, providing an alter3II
native to the Soviet-controlled Radio Berlin.
Two days
later, Soviet propaganda received another blow.

Striking

fear in German hearts, they repeatedly announced the expect3*5
ed withdrawal of American troops. ^

The rumor was dispersed

^ I b l d . , p. 126. Blaming their own crimes on others
has always been a favorite Soviet technique.
32
^ Litchfield et al., Governing Postwar Germany, p.
157.
-^Grosser, The Colossus Again, p. 70.
34
J Berlin, Press and Information Office, in co-opera
tion with Statistical Office, Berlin: Figures, Information,
Charts, prepared by Heinz Moos (Berlin: Press and Information Office, 1963), P. 12. Hereafter oited as Berlins Fig
ures. Information. Charts.

3*5

•^Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 18 7 . The Soviet-spread
rumor was based on Roosevelt*s remark at Yalta* There, the
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when U.S. Secratary of State James P. Byrnes responded to
General Clay’s appeal to invalidate communist propaganda.
Addressing a German audience at Stuttgart, he ”sounded the
first constructive note which had come from the Western oc
cupying powers. ^

Secretary Byrnes boosted German morale,

assuring them that American armed forces would stay as long
as the situation demanded it, "probably . . * for a long
period.
The result of the Berlin municipal elections of Oct
ober 30, 1946, has made history.

Berliners inflicted a de

vastating defeat upon the Communists.

The SED trailed the

two major democratic parties, the SPD and the CDU (Chris
tian Democratic Union).

Only the relatively minor LDP (Lib

eral Democratic Party) gained fewer votes than the Communlsts. ^

The utter defeat was caused by their close associa

tion with the Russians; all SMA measures had been supported
President limited the maintenance of U.S. armed forces in
Europe to two years after the defeat of Germany. See Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, p. 127.
•^Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 78.
^^Ibid., P* 80. For tiie complete speech see Basic Am
erican Documents, 1941-49. PP* 522-527.
■^Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 190.
•^Election results: SPD: 1*8.7%, DCU: 22.2^, SED:
19.8^, LDP: 9*3^* See Berlin: Figures. Information. Charts,
p. 12. See also Howley. Berlin Command, p. 131*. Clay. De
cision in Germany, p. 139 •» and Leonhard, Die Revolution entl^sst ihre Kinder, p. 452.
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and defended by the SED.**’0

Encouraging the Germans during

the election campaign had borne rich fruit for the Ameri
cans— a vote of confidence.

With this development, the

Western powers came to realize that the future held a re
alignment in store.

Former enemies, the Western Allies and

Germany, would face the new menace to world peace, the Soviki
et Union, together.
Soviet policies adjusted rapidly to the changed sit
uation.

Since they had been repudiated by the electorate,

their dream of eventually gaining control of all of Germany
by first winning Berlin had dissolved.

The idea to consoli

date the area under their immediate control replaced the
outdated strategy.

Berlin remained a tempting prize, seem

ingly within Soviet reach.
To postpone and possibly to prevent the start of a
truly democratic city administration, the SMA exerted its
power in the inter-Allied Kommandatura.

German city offi

cials were subject to Kommandatura approval.

Stalling the

process of an orderly transfer of power from the Soviet ap
pointees to the duly elected officials, Kotikov filibustered
L2
every other motion.
itQ

^5 2 .

Leonhard, Die Revolution entl&sst ihre Kinder, p*

1*1
Windsor, City on Leave, p. 50.
1*2
Howley, Berlin Command, p. 139*
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The new Lord Mayor Dr. Otto Ostrowski (SPD) was not
elected by the municipal deputies until December 5* 19^6.*^
Ostrowski cut a pitiful figure.
to cope with the situation.^

A weak man* he was unable
Intimidated by the NKVD (peo

ple’s commissariat of internal affairs, that is the Soviet
secret police), he agreed to support the SED.

As a result,

he was Impeached by the SPD and he resigned in mid-April
19^7.^
New trouble emerged for the Kommandatura.

After the

NKVD had put a lot of effort into 11converting11 Ostrowski to
their side, Kotikov was unwilling to accept his resignation.
Once again, the commandants deadlocked and had to send the
problem to the military governors for a solution.

The Con

trol Council accepted Ostrowski's resignation along with
Kotikov’s demand for inter-Allied approval of an elected ofA6
ficial in advance to an election.
Democracy had been
dealt another blow.
The effects of the new directive became Immediately
apparent.

Dr. Ernst Reuter (SPD) was nominated by the muni

cipal deputies to be the new Lord Mayor of Berlin.

In his

A3
^Berlins Figures. Information. Charts, p. 12# p. 12.
LL
Ferdinand Friedensburg, Berlins Schlcksal und Aufgabe
(Berlins P&dagogisoher Verlag Berthold Schulz7 1953)• P« 23*
Hereafter cited as Friedensburg, Berlin: Schlcksal und Aufgabe.
^Howley, Berlin Command, pp. 1A5-1A6.
w md.,

pp. 146-1^ 7 .
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youth he had been a member of the KPD.

Becoming disilluLr7
sloned, he forswore communism and joined the SPD. 1 There

fore, the Soviets considered him an arch-enemy.

Kotlkov

used his veto, thereby preventing Reuter from assuming of
fice.

Mrs, Louise Sohroeder (SPD) took over as Aoting Lord
US
Mayor; Dr. Ferdinand Friedensburg became her deputy.
Un
der the circumstances, it was a satisfactory solution.

Reu

ter did not become mayor until after the split of the city.
Struggles in the inter-Allied Kommandatura showed
the rapid deterioration of the wartime Alliance.

The rela

tionship suffered so sharp a decline within the first two
postwar years that the world was soon faced with another
abyss— the prospect of World War III.

Inter-Allied Policies in Germany
Opposing interests of the Four Powers had proven de
trimental to the exercise of inter-Allied administration of
Berlin.
el.

A similar situation developed on the national lev

However, clashes among the occupying powers were not as

violent, since they had unlimited authority within their
zones.

The Allied agreements provided for a joint policy in

matters affecting Germany as a whole, a directive which al^ Ibld.. p. 148.
U8
Friedensburg, Berlins Schlcksal und Axifgabe. pp. 232U.
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lowed varied interpretations.^

The Control Council, creat

ed to enforce the joint policy, was paralyzed most of the
time, since the Allies were unable to coordinate their aims,
U.S. polioy in Germany was guided initially by a mem
orandum issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JCS/IO 67 was

designed to ensure the enforcement of "programs of repara
tion and restitution.11^0

The controversial document had

been worked out by an interdepartmental committee, which re
flected the conflicting views of Secretaries Hull, Stimson,
and Morgenthau.-^

Rejecting the idea to partition Germany,

it limited the powers of OMGUS by ordering to carry out a
punitive program.

Apart from the polioy of denazification,

^demilitarization, decentralization, and non-fraternization,
JCS/IO 67 projected a remodeled Morgenthau Plan— the denuding
<2
of industry and the maximum pastoral!zation of Germany.
Ug

Berlin, by contrast, was to be administered jointly.
The path left to the commandants was too narrow to steer away from a collision course. See Rudolf R. Leglen, The Four
Power Agreements on Berlin: Alternative Solutions to the
Status Quo?, trans. Trevor Davies (Berlin: Carl Heymanns
Verlag, 1961), pp. 13, 15, 27.
^°Ratchford and Ross, Berlin Reparations Assignment,
pp. ^0-^1.
^ O p i e et al., The Search of Peace Settlements, p. 7*K
12
J Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 17-18. President
Truman dis11ke & ‘the Morgenthau Plan and opposed the Secre
t a r y ^ mingling in foreign policy. When Morgenthau threat
ened to resign if he would not be included in the U.S. dele
gation to Potsdam, Truman Immediately accepted his resigna
tion. See Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 270. Consid
ering that JCS/10 67 was issued only two weeks after Roose-
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General Clay* as military governor responsible for the pro
per execution of the directive, was shocked by ,fits failure
to grasp the realities of the financial and economic condi
tions which confronted” OMGUS.^

JCS/1067* he said* “con

templated [a] Carthaginian peace.
Washington did not react to Clay’s plea for a policy
revision until July 15* 19^7

Based on Secretary Byrnes’

19^6 Stuttgart speech, the new directive, JCS/1779* aimed at
“the creation of those political, economic and moral condi
tions in Germany which will contribute most effectively to a
stable and prosperous E u r o p e . T h e right of the Germans
to “higher standards of living,” was also acknowledged.
The British generally supported U.S. policies.
1067 was one of the few exceptions.

<7
JCS/

They considered the di

rective too impractical to follow i t . ^

Going along with

Churchill's negative attitude toward the Soviet Union* the
Labor government instructed its representative on the Con
trol Council, General Sir Brian Robertson, to remain suspivelt's death, it is not amazing that the negative implica
tions of the directive escaped Truman's attention.
•^Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 18.
^ I b l d .. p. 19.
233>

55Ibld., p. 237.

Ople et al*. The Search for Peace Settlements, p.

57rbia.
^Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 285«
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clous of Soviet intentions, and to oppose their designs.
Although SHAEF had been dissolved on July 13» 1 9 ^ 5 * ^ AngloAmerican relations remained excellent#

Most of the time,

especially when democratic principles were involved, the
British seconded American motions#

A Soviet representative

on the Allied Control Commission, Major Gregory Klimov,
characterized the British attitude as follows:
Great Britain had played out her role, and now, with
a pride born of self-confidence, was surrendering
her place to the younger and stronger as befitted a
gentlemani
France, snubbed at Potsdam by the Big Three who
failed to invite her to the Conference, stayed aloof#

Turn

ing the rebuff into an asset, the French frequently vetoed
the Potsdam Protocol#^

The policy, pursued by France was

inspired by the wish to weaken Germany permanently.
no confidence in the democratization of Germany#

62

She had
There

fore, the French advocated a radical decentralization of
63
political institutions# ^

all

France was not free from terri

torial ambitions, since she wished to sever the heavily in
dustrialized Saar area from Germany as part of her repara-^Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 441.
^0Klimov, The Terror Machine, p. 441.
^Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, pp. 286-287.
^2Clay, Decision in Germany. P# 105*
63Ibld.. p. 110.
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tions.

6k

Often, France's national Interests were a hin

drance to the execution of Anglo-American plans.

The Soviet

Union benefitted from the disharmony among the Western Al
lies.^

Major Klimov’s characterization was fitting:

France was the reflection of all the greatness
to be found In European culture. But only the re
flection. Her representatives were the successors
to Bonaparte and Voltaire, the contemporaries of
Pierre P^tain and Jean-Paul Sartre. Existentialism*
How to keep one's head above the water* °
The aims of the Soviet Union were clear.

Her ac

tion in Berlin and in the Soviet zone gave a direct indica
tion of her policy.

The communists wanted to gain as much

as possible, politically as well as economically.

The de

sire for reparations, along with an iron will to further
their alms— if necessary by force— were the gist of Soviet
policies.

They acted accordingly.

Considering the divergent attitudes of the Allies,
subsequent events seemed to follow a logical pattern.

At

Potsdam, the heads of government had delegated their author
ity to the military governors, presenting them with the task
to work out a Joint policy*» The Potsdam Protocol asked the
6k
France enforced her will. But the Saar area was re
turned in 1957 after the issue was put to a vote. In the
referendum, the local inhabitants elected to be rejoined
with Germany.
^Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 287.

66

Klimov, The Terror Machine, p. 1^9*
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Control Council "to perform the impossible*M '
One reason for the inefficiency of the Control Coun
cil was its very nature;
trol.

There was nothing under its con

The military governors who headed the Council remain

ed first an<| always the representatives of their countries.
Each was all-powerful in his zone, but they completely
lacked authority in the others.

If the Control Council

reached agreement, there was absolutely no way to check its
68
enforcement.
Everything depended upon good will from all
parts— a poor insurance in world power politics.
Another reason for the failure of the Control Coun
cil was embodied in its charter.

The requirement for unani

mous decisions, left that body at the mercy of the
69
U.S.S.R., 7 who made frequent use of the veto power.

Thus,

the Soviets and the French shared the dubious distinction to
have effectively blocked Anglo-American attempts at creating
the rudiments for a workable arrangement.
When the Control Council first assumed authority,
the prospects for success had not yet disappeared.

Before

too long, measures providing for denazification, demilitari^Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 283.

68

Richard Thllenius, Die Tellung Deutschlands: Elne
Zeltgesohlchtllche Analyse (Hamburgs Rowohlt Taschenbuch
Verlag, 1957). P. 133^Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs; 19^-^-53. trans. Beate Ruhm
von Oppen (London: Weidenfeld and N1colson, 1966), p. 69.
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zation* and the punishment of war criminals had been adopt
ed

But these were minor programs.

The Allies failed to

come to terms on the significant issues.
Friction developed over the question of reparations.
Both the Potsdam Protocol and JCS/106? directed the military
governors to extract an appropriate amount from Germany to
help restore the European economy.

71

After prolonged dis

putes In the Control Council, it was decided to pass the
problem to the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM), which met
three times in 19^6.

The outcome of the conferences corres

ponded to that of the Control Council— no agreement was
reached.^

Attempts to adopt measures leading to the cre

ation of central super-zonal institutions met with the same
result
Barely a year after V-E Day, the Soviets and the
Western powers embarked upon their different courses, one
trying to outsmart the other.

In Berlin, the SMA proceeded

70
f Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 10?, 109*
71
' HaJo Holborn, American Military Government: Its Or- .
ganlzatlon and Policies (Washingtons Infantry Journal Press,
19^7), P. 58.
72
' For a detailed account of the CMF meetings see Clay,
Decision in Germany, pp. 123-131* 140-1^1. Due to the dead
lock in the negotiations, resulting from the U.S.S.R.'s de
mands and the West*s refusal to meet them, the Four Powers
took reparations from their own zones, leaving the amount up
to the discretion of the individual power. See Feis, The
Potsdam Conference, pp. 255* 257.
^Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 123-12^, 131* 14-1#
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to interfere in local affairs;' at the Paris CFM meeting,
Secretary of State Byrnes stood godfather to Bizonia which
was to develop into the Federal Republic of Germany,

Indi

cating American determination to overcome the inter-Allied
deadlook, he proposed a merger of occupation zones;
The United States will join with any other occupy
ing government or governments In Germany for the
treatment of our respective zones as an economic
unit.75
Resolved to ease the burden for both the United States and
Germany, Byrnes intended to advance this plan ’’with or with
out the Soviet Uni on

France and the U.S.S.R. were dis

interested, but Great Britain was favorably disposed toward
the idea.

She anticipated another SHAEF type of arrangement.

On July 30, 1946, the British officially accepted the pro
posal.

By September 1?, 1946, Anglo-American preparations
78
were completed. Bizonia was born.
The CFM meeting held in Moscow during March and
April 1947• accomplished nothing but to widen the East-West
gap.

Violent Soviet opposition to the bizonal merger re

vealed the Kremlin*s sinister schemes to thwart Western
^ S u p r a . pp. 83-84.
^Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 195*
76rbid.
^Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, pp. 303-304.
^Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 169*

99
plans.79

jn a conversation with U.S. Secretary of State

George C. Marshall, Stalin remarked that present difficul
ties were ”only the first skirmishes of reconnaissance forces on the German question.”
Instead of frightening the West, the Soviet threats
backfired.

Secretary Marshall recognized that to agree to
A

Soviet plans would be equivalent to handing Germany and Eur0*1

ope over to communist dictatorship.

He knew that immedi

ate actions had to be taken to meet the Soviet danger.

To

acquaint the American public with the changed Busso-American relationship, the Secretary appeared on radio and re
ported on the Moscow conference.

Urging the adoption of

measures to counter the communist threat, Marshall conclud
ed:

”The patient is sinking while the doctors deliber82
ate.”
Secretary Marshall found the perfect remedy for
the ailing European countries when he envisioned the Euro
pean Recovery Program (ERP).

First mentioning his idea in

a commencement speech at Harvard in June 19^7*,

the Western

^Walter Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow (Phil
adelphia and New York: J. B. Lippencott Company, 1950), pp.
211-212. Hereafter cited as Bedell Smith, My Three Years in
Moscow* See also Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 306*
80
Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 307* See also
Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow, p. 221.
81
Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow, p. 221*
82
Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 307*
®^Clay, Decision in Germany, p. l60.
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European states, meeting in Paris from July 12 to September
84
22, willingly endorsed the plan.
The Soviet Union commanded her Eastern European satellites to reject it.

85

The Marshall Plan, as the ERP was popularly called,
offered financial aid to nations that were willing to help
themselves.

Its implementation caused the upheaval of the

established trend of thinking.

The most obvious result was

the complete reversal of Soviet-Western relations from what
they had been during the Second World War.

Some Washington

officials feared to be drawn into an armed confliot against
the U.S.S.R.

Asking U.S. Ambassador W. Bedell Smith wheth

er the Soviets steered toward war, the ambassador answered:
“Stalin said, we do not want war but the Americans want it
even less than we do, and that makes our position stronger."87
In November 1947, before the last CFM conference
took place in London, the West was put to the verbal test.
Confusing rhetoric with polemics, the Soviets hurled fantas
tic, trumped-up charges at the Western representatives,
blaming them specifically with the destruction of quadripar84
Murphy, Piplomat among Warrlors. p. 308.
®^Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 160.
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For a critical, contemporary analysis of the Mar
shall Plan see Seymore E. Harris, The European Recovery Pro
gram (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Presa)?,

1955.

^Forrestal Diaries, p. 327.
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tite administration.

Secretary Marshall replied with a calm

statement which explained the American point-of-view.

88

He

repeatedly reiterated that viewpoint at the London meet
ing.
In Western Europe, the EBP caused a more positive
change; it opened the way to economio integration.

In Janu

ary 1948, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin suggested
in a speech to Parliament "a union of Western European counqo
?
91
tries."7
Germany was to be invited to participate.7
With
the acceptance of Germany (Bizonia) as a full-fledged mem
ber of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation
(OEEC) in early 1948, her lot as an outcast neared the end.
It was the purpose of the OEEC to appropriate ERP funds to
92
member states.7
Thus, Western Europe including West Ger
many looked forward to reconstruction.
The creation of Bizonia proved to be of mutual value
to all parties involved— American, British, and German.

In

the beginning, economic aspects overshadowed all others.
Germany*s industrial center, the Ruhr area, was part of the
go

Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 161-162, 3^8.
89
7Basic American Documents, p. 571.
^ T h e Brookings Institution, Major Problems of United
States Foreign Policy; 1948-49. A Study Guide Prepared by
the International Studies Group (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1948), p. 50.
91ibia.
92
7 Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 215-217*
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British zone; the U.S. zone was primarily agricultural.
Supplementing one another, they eased the Brltish-Amerloan
administrative task and the fiscal burden of their govern
ments.
Once the United States and Great Britain had recog
nized the Soviet threat to future world peace, Bizonia^
significance increased.
halted.

The communist onslaught had to be

If Germany, because of her central location in Eur

ope should serve as a buffer, then the Germans would have to
be won over to the Western cause.

To continue the punitive

policy of JCS/1067 would have been detrimental to Allied in
terests.

The new directive, JCS/1779* issued by Washington

in 19^7* after the abortive Moscow meeting of the Council of
Foreign Ministers, reflected the changed attitude.
The West Germans benefited from the situation.
Economically, they got their share of ERP funds, enabling
them to rise from the debris of the war to new prosperity.
Politically, they were restored to an honorable place among
the nations.
To further the Anglo-American objective, German lo
cal administrations which had been developed in the differ
ed
ent states under American tutelage, J were promoted to the
bizonal level*

On February 9» 19^8, the Military Governors

Generals Clay and Robertson established a German Executive

93Ibld., pp. 86-90, 95. 98-99, 101-102.
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Committee and a High C o u r t C o m b i n e d with a legislative
branch— the Economic Council which had been constituted in
May 1 9 ^ 7 ^ — those German administrative agencies represented
the essence of a democratic government.

Supreme authority

was still vested in the military governors, but the respon
sibility of. the German officials increased steadily.

When

the time came for German self-government, a new crop of pol
iticians had been raised.

The British-American policy of
96
the democratization of Germany paid off well.
The Breakup
While the Western Allies were preoccupied with the
development of Bizonia and the ERP, the Soviets planned
their counterattacks.

The rejection in the Berlin city

elections of 19^6» the violent verbal battles in the Kommandatura, the paralysis of the Control Council, and the impos
sibility to reach agreement at the CFM conferences had con
vinced the Kremlin leaders that communism could not be ex
tended beyond the present lines of demarkation— at least for
the time being.

Smarting from Western contempt for Soviet

9\bid., pp. 180-181.

06

95IbicU, p. 168.

7 A letter from Lucius D* Clay, General, Retired, U.S.
Army, New York, N.Y., April 1^, 1967* gave ample evidence of
the strategy1s success. Evaluating Germany*s development
since the time under discussion, Clay wrote: lfI think the
German people have proved their willingness to support a de
mocratic government, and to accept some responsibility for
the government they put into power, I am glad to have them
as friends and allies in the common defense of free coun
tries. "

10^
plans and unable to check the Britlsh-American Influence in
West Germany, the Soviets were determined to fight back.
They decided to force the West out of the German capital by
blockading Berlin.
Soviet plan^
cation.

Nearly all aspects seemed to favor the

The most obvious advantage was the cityfs lo

Surrounded by Russian occupied territory, the West

hardly stood a chance to escape the trap.

The U.S.S.R. was

sure of viotory.
The Soviets were not guided by the thought of ven
geance alone.
their plans.

More Important reasons formed the basis of
Since the experiment in inter-Allied adminis

tration had turned out to be a dismal failure, the Soviet
Union ventured to lose her influence on the satellite coun
tries.

Her recent loss of prestige, she feared, might re97
suit in an uprising.^' In order to consolidate her empire

undisturbed, the U.S.S.R. intended to get rid of the Western
observers.

98

Soviet methods were not condusive to the pro

motion of her image.
Paving the way for the intended blockade, the Sov
iets resumed their verbal attack.

On February 13* and March

6, 19*f8, the Soviet Union sent identical notes to the United
99
States, Great Britain and France, 7 accusing them in both
^ Eugene Hinterhoff, D1sengagement (London: Stevens &
Sons Limited, 1959)* P. 92.
^^Nettl, The Eastern Zone, p. 108.
99
77F o t the complete text of the notes see U.S.S.R., The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Soviet Union and the Berlin
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Instances of violating the Potsdam Protocol.

The Soviets

objected to the unilateral actions of the Western Allies in
matters of economic and political recovery of the Western
zones of Germany.1^0
On March 20, 1948, Marshal Sokolovsky walked out of
the Control Council without setting the date for the next
meeting.

This signified the end of the highest inter-Allied

agenoy.^***

Thus, the only Allied institution responsible

for Germany as a whole had ceased to exist.

102

Only two

days later, the Soviets suspended all subordinate agencies
103
except the Kommandatura. ^
The commandants continued to meet until the Soviet
staged the next walk-out.

Lacking sound reasons, the SMA

had to turn to imagination to explain the breakup of all lnter-Allled administrative agencies.

On June 16, 1948, the

Kommandatura met for the last time.

For thirteen hours, the

Western commandants listened to Soviet abuse.

Then, U.S.

Commandant Howley decided to go home leaving his deputy to
sit in for him.

The Soviets considered Howley*s action an

Question (Moscow: 1948), pp. 5-6, 7-17. Hereafter cited as
U.S.S.R., The Soviet Union and the Berlin Question.
100Ibld.
^■®^Clay, Decision In Germany, pp. 355-357•
102
Meissner, Russland. die Weltm&chte und Deutschland.
P* 73.
*^^0pie et al., The Search for Peace Settlements, p.

252.
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intolerable affront.

They walked, out.

10 4

Only two days later, the Russians nfound themselves
in the unenviable position of the hunter who shoots his gun
in the air and watches the deer run by.t1^-*

The Western

powers announced a ourrency reform for their zones of occuTn 6
pation to become effective on June 20, 1948.
Sokolovsky responded with a proclamation to the Ger
man p e o p l e . D e n u n c l a t l n g the Western Allies and oharging
them with violating the Four Power agreements, in particular
the Potsdam Protocol, the Russians became guilty of the very
same thing.

He violated both the EAC agreements and the

Yalta decisions when he declared:
Currency issued in the Western zones of occupa
tion in Germany will not be permitted to circulate
in the Soviet zone of occupation and in the area of
Greater Berlin which comes within the Soviet Zone
of occupation and is economically part of the Sov
iet Zone.10y
The latter portion of the statement aimed at providing the
104
Howley, Berlin Command, pp. 179-181.
105Ibld., p. 184.
Clay, Decision In Germany, p. 362. The Western
powers did not decide to introduoe a new currency until
after the breakup of the Control Council. June 1, was the
target date for Bizonia to start circulating the new money.
Owing to sudden French interest in trizonal arrangements,
the measure was postponed until June 20, 1948. Ibid., p.
212. See also Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 313*
107
U.S.S.R., The Soviet Union and the Berlin Question,
pp. 21-24.
108Ibld.. p. 24.

107
new Soviet policy toward Berlin with an appearance of lega
lity.

Included in a proclamation, it assumed the character

of an order.
Soviets.

Legal finesse, however, did not concern the

Tfie proclamation stated with blunt authority:

"These regulations have the force of law."10^
Fortunately, the Western Allies were by now used to
Soviet tactics.
ness.

Russian threats had lost their effective

Both sides were set on their different courses.

outcome of the crisis could have been expected:

The

The Soviets

decreed a currency reform for the Soviet zone and all Ber
lin;

the Western powers countered by introducing the new

West German currency in the three Western s e c t o r s . B o t h
112
orders were issued on June 23# 19^8 •
The Berlin Blockade
On June 2k, 19^8, the Soviets quit talking and
started to act.

A "technical interruption” induced the SMA

to stop all rail traffic leading to and from the Western sec
tors of B e r l i n . S i n c e roads and waterways were already
109Ibld.

110Ibld., pp. 28-29.

Ill

Great Britain, Foreign Office, Germany: An Account
of the Events Leading up to a Reference of the Berlin Que'stlon to the United Nations: 11th October, 1948. Cond. 753^.
(His Majesty*s Stationary Office, 19^8), p. 18* Hereafter
cited as Brit. Foreign Office, The Berlin Question.
^ ^ Berlln Documents, pp. 62-63*
113Ibld.. p. 63.
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closed,

Un

West Berlin was completely Isolated.

The Iron

curtain had clamped down; 2 ,500,000 people were caught in
the middle of the East-West struggle.

Their fate hung lit

erally in the air.
OMGUS was prepared for the emergency.

As the

U.S.S.R. gradually tightened her grip around Berlin, the
Allies had stocked up a small supply— enough to last for
3

about a month, distributing minimum rations.

11*5
J

To avoid

a decrease in stocks, Genral Clay called Air Commander
Lieutenant General Curtis S. LeMay, ordering the entire C-47
fleet on the Berlin run.

The first planes arrived in the

blockaded city on the next morning, June 25, 19^8.

It

was the birth of the airlift.
While General Clay as military governor of the U.S.
zone had to keep the over-all situation in mind, Colonel
Howley as U.S. commandant of Berlin was more concerned with
local problems.

The most urgent task was to boost the mor

ale of the frightened population.

Berliners were isolated

from the world, threatened with starvation, and their elec
tricity had been cut off.

Not yet satisfied with the physi-

11^
Beginning in March 19^8, the Soviets imposed more
and more restrictions on traffic to and from Berlin. The
SMA harassed the Western Allies just as much as the Germans.
For a chronological enumeration of the process of strangula
tion see Brit. Foreign Office, The Berlin Question, pp. 1519*
^••^Clay, Decision in Germany, p. 365*
ll 6Ibld.. pp. 365-366.
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cal hardships of the blockade, the Soviets pulled every
trick of psychological warfare they knew.
to cut off the water too.

They threatened

But more enervating than anything

else was the rumor that the savage Mongolian hordes, who had
sacked the city after the defeat, would return.

To add

color to the rumors, Soviet armed forces held maneuvers just
beyond the city limits.

RIAS.

Colonel Howley decided to address the Berliners over
118
Without informing General Clay beforehand,
Howley

assured the Germans of American support.

He promised that

the United States would stay in Berlin and that they would
^119
face the crisis together.
7 After Howley*s radio announce
ment, Berliners regained their courage.
Clay’s and Howley*s independent actions were prob
ably the most amazing aspects of the first day of the block
ade.

Before Washington had recovered from the Soviet blow,

the men on the spot had taken care of the most urgent prob120
lems.
For once, the right men were in the right place at
the right time,
■^^Howley, Berlin Command, pp. 198-199* 202-203.
118
Letter from Frank L. Howley, Brigadier General, Re
tired, U.S. Army, New York, N.Y., April 10, 19&7- Howley
explained: flIt wasn*t a time for conferences— it was a time
for action and quick.”
^^Howley, Berlin Command, p. 200.
120

Who influenced who cannot properly be established.
Howley wrote: "Our Lciay’s and Howley*sj actions in Berlin

110
Both Clay and Howley had shown courage and fore
sight.

Their measures were endorsed by President Truman.

Clay*s idea of the airlift was revolutionary.
took a layman to envision it.

Obviously, it

The experts, especially Air

Force Chief of Staff, General Hoyt. S. Vandenberg, saw many
obstacles and opposed the plan.

Vandenberg argued that U.S.

bases around the world would have to be denuded, weakening
the U.S.A. in too many spots, on order to ensure the success
^

of the project.

121

Truman preferred the airlift to the more dangerous

% 122

task of sending an armed convoy to Berlin.

In the begin

ning, the airlift was considered a short, temporary means
that would allow the Allies to overcome the diplomatic dead
lock without having to negotiate under pressure.

With this

thought in mind, Truman ordered every available plane on the
°\121
Berlin run. J By June 28, 19^8, President Truman had adop
ted Howley*s attitudes

The United States would not give in

to Soviet pressure.
certainly determined Washlngton*s policy.” Frank L. Howley,
personal letter, April 10, 19 67.
121
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II: Years of Trial
and Hope (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc.,
1956), p. 125. Hereafter cited as Truman, Years of Trial
and Hope. See also Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 318.
122
Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 125-126.
^2^Ibid., p. 123.
12

See also Forrestal Diaries, p. **52.

Forrestal Diaries, p* ^55*

Ill
Thie two World Wars had put the United States In the
unoontested position as leader of the Western world.

Tru

man’s decision to stay in Berlin and to face the Soviet
threat acknowledged this fact.

With it, the United States

departed decisively from the old idea of isolationism.

Re

sponsibility and risks that go with leadership were accepted
** 125
instead.
D
’‘Operation Vittles,** as the airlift was nicknamed,
reflected the attitude of the Western nations toward one
another.

The British were true partners of the U.S., making

every effort to serve the common purpose.

The French, by

contrast, could not yet warm up to an enterprise which
strained national resources for the sake of Germans.

France

did not participate in the airlift, but she stayed in Berlin
!'2"
along with the others.3Instead of driving a wedge between the Western Al
lies and the Germans— the hesitant rapport, exemplified in
extending ERP help to Germany, was still quite new— the So
viet blockade of Berlin helped to raise the German cause be
yond the purely pragmatio approach to a symbolic level.

The

quest for freedom and the rights of man were threatened.
The challenge was met.

Ernst Reuter, the Berlin mayor who

^^^Charles B. Robson (ed.), Berlins Pivot of German
Destiny (Chapel Hill: The University of North' Carolina
Press, i960), p. 48.
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Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 318*
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had been prevented from assuming offloe by a Soviet veto In
the Kommandatura, stated In a Berlin mass demonstrations
We appeal to the people throughout the world! In
America, in Great Britain, in France and Italy—
wherever you may be— gaze on this city and realize
that Berlin and its people cannot be abandoned*
They must not be abandoned! 7^' v
The appeal was heard and Berlin was saved*
During the eleven months long blockade, the airlift
128
brought 1,73&»781 tons of goods into the city.
It took
212,621 flights to accomplish the task.^*^

So life went on

in the beleaguered city.

Export goods produced during this
^130
time bore the proud stamp "Made in Blockaded Berlin." ^
In spite of the tremendous hardship and sacrifi/<r*131
ces, ^ the SMA preferred to deny the very existence of the
blockade, and to ridicule the airlift as a Western propagan127
rBerlin, Press and Information Office, in co-opera
tion with Horst Korber, Reference; Berlin, English version
prepared by Michael S* Berenson (Berlin; Press and Informa
tion Office of Berlin, 1963)* P. 12.
128
Erich Schmidt Verlag (ed*), Hauptstadt Berlin: Sonderheft der Zahlenbilder aus Politic, WirtschaftV Kultur
(Berlins Erich Schmidt VerlagV 1963). P. 8 . Hereafter cited
as Schmidt Verlag (ed*), Hauptstadt Berlin* The total was
divided as follows: coal: 62.8%, food: 27*9#, and industrial
goods: 9 .3#*

129Ibid.
^°Lowell Bennett, Berlin Bastion: The Epic of PostWar Berlin (Frankfurt am Main: Fred Rudl Publisher, 1951),
P. 155.
^■•^Seventy-four American and British fliers lost their
life. See Schmidt Verlag (ed.), Hauptstadt Berlin, p. 8 .
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da device.

According to Sokolovsky, the Soviets never in

tended to force the Western powers out of Berlin, nor did

132

they want to starve the Berliners into submission. J

For

tunately, the Soviets were unable to do either one or the
other.

The only thing they achieved was the deepening of

the East-West split.

Berlin truly became a divided city.

As a result of communist pressure in East Berlin, the duly
elected deputies transferred their offices and their meet
ing place to West Berlin.

The SED retaliated by proclaiming
*^133
the set-up of a separate East Berlin city government.
The Settlement
The airlift had been initially started to prevent

the Western powers from losing ground before the crisis
could be settled on the diplomatic level.

It continued un

til the Soviets realized that their blockade was a failure
and that the Western Allies could not be forced out of Ber
lin.

While world attention centered on the dramatic events

in Berlin, the wheels of diplomacy were set in motion.
On July 6, 19^8, the United States and Great Britain
delivered Identical notes to the Soviet Union.

The notes

protested the Soviet blockade and reasserted Western rights
^■^Gunther Albrecht (ed.), Berlin in Bliokpunkt der
Welt: Elne Dolmmentat1on uber RecHt"und~ “uhrecht urn und in
Berlin 19W bis 1959
BQrlln: VEB Deut?cher^Zentralveriag,' 1959), P. «!•

133

•^Berlins Figures. Information, Charts, p. 13*
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In Berlin as Based on the Four Power agreements. ^

The So

viet note of July 14, 1948, rejected the Western interpreta
tion of the agreements.

Instead, the U.S.S.R. charged that

the Western Allies had lost their rights to be in Berlin as
a result of their preparations for the establishment of a
West German Government.
as a particular

The currency reform was mentioned

ex a mple.1 ^

^

Although the two views were diametrically opposed,
Truman, hoping that a compromise might be reached, instructed Ambassador Smith to confer with Stalin.
discussions seemed promising.

136

The Moscow

Stalin dropped his demand

that the Western powers should delay any further prepara
tions for a West German government.

He insisted, however,

that the East German currency should be introduced in all
Berlin.

With the understanding that the currency would be

controlled by the Four Powers, Ambassador Smith and British
and French colleagues, agreed to the proposal.
work out a formal statement failed.

Attempts to

Molotov asserted that

^^U.S., Department of State, Germany: 1947-1949; The
Story in Documents, Department of State Publication No. 3556
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), pp.
205-206. Hereafter cited as Documents on Germany: 19471949* See also Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow, p.
237.
^^U.S.S.R., The Soviet Union and the Berlin Question,
pp. 42-46. See also Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow,
p. 238., and Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 123.
^-^Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow, p. 238.
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the Western Allies were In Berlin not by legal rights but by
Soviet sufferenoe only* There was no meeting of the
■X4/
117
minds. -/f After a month of negotiations, it was decided to
refer the currency question to the military governors in
Berlin.

They were directed to work out an arrangement that

would make the Eastern currency the only legal tender in
Berlin.
The first Control Council meeting since the Russian
walk-out was an exercise in frustration.

Refusing to even

consider Four Power control of the East German currency,
Sokolovsky added new Soviet demands— the complete control
of the Berlin trade and restrictions on air traffic.

Ob

viously, the Soviets were so sure of the effectiveness of
the blockade that they saw no reason to come to terms with
the Western Allies,

After seven meetings of the Control

Council, the talks were abondoned.
138 ^
were hopelessly deadlocked. ^

The military governors

In October 1948, the problem was put before the
1*1,0 %?\
United Nations* Security Council. v The Soviet Union de•^^Ibid., pp. 243-247, 249-250*
of Trial and Hope, pp. 126-127.

See also Truman, Years

■^^U.S., Department of State, The Berlin Crisis: Report
on the Moscow Discussions, Department of State Publication
No. 3298 (Washingtoni U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948),
p. 40.
■^Clay, Decision in Germany, pp. 370-371*
^°Brit. Foreign Office, The Berlin Question, p. 84.
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nied the competence of the Security Council.

Ikl

She re-

fused to participate in the United Nations deliberations.

142

Throughout the winter of 1948-1949» the U.N. continued to
discuss the problem, but was unable to settle the dis1hr*$°
pute. ^ This was an impossible task as long as any one of
the principal parties was unwilling to come to terms.
Finally, after eleven months, the Soviets recognized
the futility of the blockade.

Throughout the winter they

had hoped that the airlift would break down under inclement
weather conditions.

When, contrary to the experts* estima

tions, the constant drone of the planes— heartbeat of Ber
lin-remained steady, the Soviet dream turned into a night
mare.

They gained nothing, but they lost more prestige than

they could afford.

They gave up.

Powers came to an agreement.

In May 1949» the Four

Effective May 12, 1949, the

blockade was lifted, and relations among the Four Powers
144 51
were restored to the status quo ante.
It seemed on the surface as if the year-long strug
gle had been useless for either side.
changes of world importance.
141
p. 84.
142

In reality it caused

The Berlin blockade terminated

U.S.S.B., The Soviet Union and the Berlin Question.
Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 129.

143
-'John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New Yorkj The Mac
millan Company, 1950)» P* 58.
144
Documents on Germany: 1947-1949. p# 274.

2 ,c/
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the war-time Alliance.

The airlift was the beginning of a

new world realignment.

The Western Allies recognized the

need to accept Germany as an equal partner in their midst.
To initiate the process, the administration of the Western
gones was returned to German rule in the form of the Occupa1UZP ^
tion Statute of May 1^, 19^9.
Pull sovereignty was not
yet given to the Germans,

since the Allies reserved the

right to resume authority at any given time.

l/j-73
'

On May 23*

1949, the Baflc Law of the Federal Republic of Germany was
enaoted,

providing her with a constitution.

was made a state of the Federal Republic.

West Berlin

Countering the

Western move, the Soviets proclaimed the establishment of
the so-called German Democratic Republic on October 7,
12lq
1949. y East Berlin was made the capital of the "German
Democratic Republic.M
plete.

Thus, the East-West split was com

Germany and Berlin gave physical evidence of the end

of the World War II alliance— a divided city in a divided
country.

The cold war had started.

^ ^ Berlln; Figures. Information. Charts, p. 1*K
1k6
Complete sovereignty was restored to Germany on May
5* 1955t simultaneous to German entry into NATO.
IA7
'Frederick W. Pick, Peacemaking in Perspective (Ox
ford: Pen-in-Hand Publ. Co. Ltd., 1950), p. 175*
1|iQ
Documents on Germany: 19^7-19*f9. pp. 283-305*
‘^

Berlin: Figures. Information. Charts, p. l*f.

CONCLUSION
After ten years of upheaval, the world returned, in
19^5, to a system of balance of power.

Although much of

the war had been fought on European soil, and major crises
would rock the continent in the future, Europe*s role as a
result of the war, was not to be as decisive as before.
The centers of powers were shifted to the United States and
the Soviet Union.

Henceforth, world policies would large

ly be directed from Washington and Moscow.

This trend had

begun during the war; but while the two had been Allies in
World War II, they were antagonists in the cold war which
followed and seemingly resulted from the wartime struggle•
The hastily arranged "war marriage" between the
Western Allies and the Soviet Union, drawn together for the
purpose of defeating a common enemy, lasted for the dura
tion of the war only.

The "divorce proceedings" were Initi

ated immediately after the capitulation of Germany, and the
nearer the world came to the final end of the war, the fur
ther the Soviet-Anglo-Amerlcan Alliance drifted apart.
Conflicting aims regarding postwar polloies oaused the
split.

Considering that the principles of democracy and

dictatorship are diametrically opposed, this development
118

119
was not surprising.

As long as a united military effort

was essential to assure the defeat of Germany, the
U.S.S.R.'s political make-up was conveniently overlooked
by the Western Allies, and she was welcomed as a slightly
'•radical11 state within the fold of the nations opposed to
Hitler and his allies.
The Soviet union's different intentions first be
came apparent to the Western leaders as a result of the
Russian treatment of the Polish problem.

Some Western

leaders, (Churchill), quickly seemed to sense the differ
ence in views; others, (including Roosevelt and his closest
advisers), were slower to accept the situation as changed.
The fact that the U.S.S.R. had, during the war, joined the
Western Allies sentiments anticipating a peaceful, demo
cratically organized, world— by endorsing the Atlantic
Charter, and by signing the Teheran Declaration of the
Three Powers and the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe
— gave the appearance of trustworthiness to the Soviets.
Unfortunately, Big Three unity as presented to the world in
these declarations was more of a mirage than a reality.
Mistaken for reality by a war-weary world, anxious for
peace and with feverish dreams of a future ideal society,
it tended to block the more objective appraisals which
might have been made.
The anxiously awaited day of final peace, which it

120
was hoped would herald the beginning of a new utopian age,
Instead was marked by a growing awareness that the Soviet
Union*s plan was the forceful incorporation of all eastern
Europe into Moscow*s realm of influence.
In the first short half-decade after the war, the
conflicts that developed between the former Allies in Ger
many led to a sharp revision of Western policies.

While

the admission of Prance to the nearly exclusive Anglo-Amer
ican alliance probably did more to hinder than help in the
achievement of Western aims, it did no permanent damage.
It may have, in fact, hurried the process of Western Euro
pean integration, and thus may have been a blessing, since
it forced France and Germany to "bury the old hatchet" and
help to recognize the benefits to be gained by genuine co
operation.

Soviet intentions, by contrast, created the

stumbling block to joint inter-Allied administration of
Germany.

As a result, the United States, Great Britain,

and Prance, guided by realistic as well as idealistic con
cepts, reluctantly accepted the fact that the future could
not be jeopardized any longer, and decided to take separate
actions.

Therefore, Bizonia was created, JCS/10 67 was re

vised, preparations for a German administration were made,
and, ultimately, Germany was included among the Western
European nations that were to benefit from Marshall Plan
aid.
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Berlin, finally, was destined to play a special
role.

Events in Western Europe might have developed along

similar lines, even if the historic capital of modern Ger
many had never come under joint inter-Allied administra
tion.

As it was, the direct East-West confrontation in the

German capital helped to speed the exposure of the Soviet
Union1s true aims and her methods of achieving them.

The

Soviet threat to the freedom of Berlin, especially during
the 19^8/49 blockade, resulted in the development of a
wave of sympathy that encompassed the whole of the free
world.

Not only the German people but people throughout

the free world became emotionally involved.
Germans became an attitude of the past.

To "hate11 the

Conversely, the

Western response to the blockade— the airlift— demonstrated
to the German people that Western devotion to the ideas of
freedom and democracy went beyond idle talk.

The Atlantic*

Charter and the Declaration on Liberated Europe had ap
peared to some as ,fmere words ;,f now it was demonstrated
that the West would support such sentiments by action.
Thus, the foundations of the German-Western alliance of the
years after 1950 were forged during the blookade, when
Berlin served as a symbol of man’s determination to pre
serve freedom.

APPENDIX
List of Abbreviations and Codes
t

CDU

Christian Democratic union

CFM

Council of Foreign Ministers

EAC

European Advisory Commission

ERP

European Recovery Program

JCS

Joint Chiefs of Staff

KPD

Communist Party of Germany

LDP

Liberal Democratic Party

NKVD

Soviet Secret Police

NSDAP

National Socialist German Labor Party (Nazi)

OEEC

Organization of European Economic Cooperation

OKW

German Armed Forces High Command

OMGUS

Office of Military Government, United States

OVERLORD

Code name for the Atlantic invasion

RIAS

Radio in the American Sector

SED

Socialist Unity Party

SHAEF

Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expedition
ary Forces

SMA

Soviet Military Administration

SPD

Social Democratic Party

TERMINAL

Code name for the Potsdam Conference
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